LIBRARY ^
UNIVERSITY Of I CALIFORNIA I
SAN OICSO j
2
I^S^
INTERNATIONAL SERIES, No. 3
KDITED HY
CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. WAGNER,
Sixth Infantry, U. S. Army; Instructor in the Art of War at the V. S. Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
TACTICAL STUDII<:S
ON THE
Battles Around Plevna,
By THILO VON TROTHA,
Captain of the Grenadier Regiment P'rederick William IV. Attached).
WITH ONE MAP.
Translated by Carl Reichmann,
First Lieutenant gth Infantry, U. S. Army.
lyH-,.
HUDSON-KIMUKKI.Y rrBI.lSIllNC. COMTANY.
lOH lOlti WvANHorrF. Strekt.
KANSAS CITY. MO.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1896,
By HUDSON-KIMBKRLY PUBLISHING CO.,
In the OflSce of the Librarian of Congrsss, Washington, D. C.
EDITOR'S PREFACE.
Among the many books on the Turko-Russian war of 1877 8, two works stand out prominently; namely, Greene's "Russian Campaigns in Turkey," which is universally recog- nized as a military classic, and Von Trotha's able work, which, though long and favorably known in Germany, is here presented in English for the first time. Of the latter work it is perhaps sufficient to say that, in its full and care- ful consideration of tactical matters, it forms a worthy sup- plement to the former, and as such it will doubtless prove welcome to American and English readers. U. S. Infantry and Cavalry School,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 1, 1896.
INDEX.
Ammunition supply, 52.
Archangel Regiment, at Plevna on July 19th, 43; inaction on July 20th,
46; losses on July 29th, 49; criticised, .52; at first battle of Plevna, 57;
at second battle'of Plevna, 105; at the last sortie, 185. Armament of the opposing infantry, 212. Arnoldi, General, supersedes Kryloff on the left bank of the Vid, 155;
at Dolni Dubnik, 167. Artillery, comments on, 221.
Astrachan Dragoons, ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 134. Babakonak pass, 37.
Bashi-bozouks, mentioned, 22, 77; on the left bank of the Vid, 141. Bazaine, Marshal, his action at Metz, discussed, 196. Berdan rifles used at Plevna by Russians, 117, 211. Biskupski, makes a reconnaissance on July 29th, 68. Bug Lancers, ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 141. Caucasian Cossacks, action on night of 1.5th-16th July, 43; at Plevna
on July 19th, 43; in action July 20th, 48; at capture of Lovtcha, 83;
at second battle of Plevna, 94; on left bank of the Vid, 142; at
Gorni Dubnik. 160; at Telis, 169. Cavalry, comments, 215.
Charkof Lancers, on the left bank of the Vid, 145. Charles of Roumania, 15; commands Roumanian Army, 27; orders
final dispositions at Plevna, 184. Chasseur regiments, at Gorni Dubnik, 163; at Telis, 165. Chefket Pasha, reenforces the army at Plevna, 153; attempts to succor
the "etappen" posts, 169. Chifsi Pasha, commanding the fortified posts in rear of Plevna, 154;
surrenders, 164. Coast Arm}', mentioned, 9. Combat, character of, 2"3. Czarowitz, mentioned, 13, 15 Daniloff, General, at the last sortie, 186. Danube campaign, review of, 9.
Dismounted fighting, criticised in the Russian Army, 219. Dobrovolski, General, at capture of Lovtcha, 84; at second battle of
Plevna, 100; killed, 126. Dobrudja, mentioned, 12. Don Cossacks, before Plevna on July 19th, 43; in action of July 20th,
45; criticised, 51; at second battle of Plevna, 94; ordered to the
left bank of the Vid, 134; numbers, 216. DoTobanzes regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of
Plevna, 105; on the left bank of the Vid, 139. Dragoon regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 76; on the left bank of
the Vid, 138; at Telis, 165; at Dolni Dubnik, 168; at investment of
Plevna, 182. Ellis, General, at Gorni Dubnik, 159. Entrenching tools, 212. Estland Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 87; at second battle of
Plevna, 98.
Inaex. 5
Finland Regiment, at Gorni Dubnik, 162.
Fire of masses, 203.
Formak, General, commanding militia brigade, 157.
Fortresses and field entrenchments, 225.
Galitz Regiment, in action of July 20th, 47; at first battle of Plevna, 57;
at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of Plevna, 94. Ganetzki, General, commands a sector of the line of investment, 182;
at last sortie, 189; receives the surrender, 191. Gorni Dubnik, use of artillery at, 224. Gortaloff, Major, killed, 125. Gourko, General, mentioned, 13, 15; in rear of Plevna, 155; captures
Gorni Dubnik, 162; seizes the passes over the Balkans, 183. Grand Headquarters, mentioned, 13, 15. "Green Hills" of Plevna, mentioned, 39; attacked, 98. Grenadiers, arrive from Russia, 31; defeat the final sortie of the Turks,
33, 185; at Gorni Dubnik, 159; at Telis, 167; at investment of
Plevna, 182. Grivitza redoubt, mentioned, 30, 97. Guard corps, arrival from Russia, 31, 154; in actions in rear of Plevna,
174. Haki Pasha, surrenders at Telis, 170. Hussar regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 75; on the left bank of the
Vid, 143; at Telis, 165; at Dolni Dubnik, 168; at investment of
Plevna, 182. Imeretinski, General, arrives from Lovtcha, 29; ordered to attack
Lovtcha, 83; at second battle of Plevna, 94. Infantry, comments on, 209.
Ingermanland Regiment, at second battle of Plevna, 132. Ismailof Regiment at Gorni Dubnik, 163. Jablonitza pass, mentioned, 92. Jaroslof Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 62; losses, 65; at sortie of
August 31st, 76; at second battle of Plevna, 108. Kalarashi regiments, on the left bank of the Vid, 138. Kaluga Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 86; at second battle of
Plevna, 98. Kataley, General, commands a sector of the investment, 182. Kazan Dragoons, ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 134. Kazan Regiment, position on August 31st, 76; at capture of Lovtcha,
83; at second battle of Plevna, 108. Kerim Pasha, his secret plan, 10, 2D2. Kieff Regiment, at the second battle of Plevna, 94. Koloma Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 59; losses, 65; assigned to
the left wing, 73; at sortie on August 31st, 76; at second battle of
Plevna, 108. Kosloff Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 56; at second battle of
Plevna, 108. Kostroma Regiment, arrives before Plevna, July 19th, 43; in the action
of July 20th, 47; losses, 49; criticised, -52. Kourloff, General, at the last sortie, 189. Krenk rifles, used by Russians, 117, 211. Krishin redoubt, attacked, 98. Kriidener, General, mentioned, 14; orders the occupation of Plevna,
24; reinforced, 25; defeated, 26; at the first battle of Plevna, 56;
criticised, 67; at the second battle of Plevna, 93; commanding a
sector of the investment, 181.
i5 Index.
Kryloff, General, commanding cavalry on the left bank of the Vid, 31; commanding the Fourth Corps, 75; at the second battle of Plevna, 93; commanding the "combined cavalry corps," 142; driven back by Turkish relief troops, 153.
Kuban Regiment, on the left bank of the Vid, 146; at Gorni Dubnik, 161.
Kuropatkin, Captain, at capture of Lo\i:cha, 89; at second battle of Plevna, 113; wounded, 123.
Kursk Regiment, at battle of Plevna, 55; losses, 65.
Lancer regiments, at sortie of August 31st, 75; on the left bank of the Vid, 135; at Dolni Dubnik, 168; at Telis, 170; at investment of Plevna, 182.
Leontieff, General, at second battle of Plevna, 94.
Levis, Colonel, on the left bank of the Vid, 145; driven back by relief troops, 154.
Libau Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 86; at second battle of Plevna, 100.
Loshkareff, General, on the left bank of the Vid, 31, 134; at the first battle of Plevna, 55; at the second battle of Plevna, 94; ordered to Bogot, 142.
Lovtcha, mentioned, 83; advance on, 19, 83; arrangements for capture of, 84; action on right bank of the Osma, 85; action on the left bank, 87; losses, 88; attempts to relieve, 88; comments, 89.
Mariopul Hussars, on the left bank of the Vid, 145.
Mariopul Regiment, at the second battle of Plevna, 94.
Mehemed Ali Pasha, mentioned, 15,17; at Sophia, 32.
Midhat Pasha, governor of the Danube province, 35.
Moscow Regiment, at Gorni Dubnik, 159.
Moszewoi, Colonel, at second battle of Plevna, 115.
Muravieff, General, at investment of Kars, 192.
Mustahafiz, mentioned, 11.
National Guard, mentioned, 11.
Nicholas, Grand Duke, mentioned, 9.
Orloff, Colonel, at second battle of Plevna, 121.
Osman Pasha, mentioned, 10, 11, 14; starts from Widdin, 23; sortie of August 31st, 28; surrenders, 34, 191; at second battle of Plevna, 119; supplies his army, 154; attempts to break the investment, 183.
Pawlof Regiment, at Gorni Dubnik, 162.
Peabody-Martini rifles, used by the Turks, 211.
Pelisha't, sortie of August 31st, 28, 75.
Penza Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 57; at second battle of Plevna, 108.
Plans of operations, 19-^.
Plevna, review of operations around, 22; geographical conditions, 35; topographical conditions, 38; fortifications, 40; advance on July 19th, 43; attack on July 20th, 14, 45; losses on July 20th, 49, battle of July 30th, 54; position of troops on July 29th, 54; dispositions for July 30th, 55; events up to 2:30 p. m. July 30th, .56; Russian right attack July 30th, 57; Russian left attack Ju y 30th, 60; Skobeleff's attack July 30th, 62; losses on July 30th, 65;' panic at Sistova, 65; comments on battle of July 30th, 67; artillery attack on Septem- ber 7th-10th, 93; comments on artillery attack, 101; battles on September 11th andl2th, 10:^; dispositions on September 11th, 103; attack on the Grivitza works, 105; attack on the Radischevo works, 107; attack on the Krishin works, 109; losses in second battle of
Index. 7
Plevna, 125; comments on second battle of Plevna, 127; cavalrv on the left bank of the Vid, 134; cavalry under Loshkareff, 134; cavalry under Kryloff, 142; comments, 148; investment from the west, 153, communications to the rear, 153; Gourko's task and dispositions, 154; capture of Gorni Dubnik, 158; events at Telis on October 24th, 165; events at Dolni Dubnik on October 24th, 167; capture of Telis on October 28th, 168; losses on the left bank of the Vid, 173; comments on events in rear of Plevna, ^74; the fall of, 181; gen- eral measures for the investment, 181; signs of the Turkish at- tempt to break out, 183; Russian dispositions for December 10th, 183, events on the left bank of the Vid, 185; events on the right bank of the Vid, 189; the surrender, 191; losses, 191; comments, 192.
Pokof Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 87.
Radischevo redoubt, attack of, 97; "Red Hill" at Lovtcha, 85.
Reaf Pasha, mentioned, 11.
Reval Regiment, at capture of Lovtcha, 86; at second battle of Plevna. 109.
Richter, General, commanding bridge at Sistova, 66.
Rifle battalions, at capture of Lovtcha, 85; at second battle of Plevna, 100; in rear of Plevna, 15 ; at Gorni Dubnik, 161; at investment of Plevna, 182.
Rifle-trenches, 203
Rodionof, General, at second battle of Plevna, 106; wounded, 126.
Rosalita pass, 37.
Roschiori, on the left bank of the Vid, 135.
Rosenbach, General, at Gorni Dubnik, 159.
Roumanian Army, mentioned, 10, 11, 16; joins the Russians, 27, 29; at the investment of Plevna, 181.
Roumanian troops, at sortie of August 31st, 78; at second battle of Plevna, 94; ordered to the left bank of the Vid, 134; at Dolni Dub- nik, 168; at the last sortie, 185.
Rykatschef, Colonel, at second battle of Plevna, 107.
Rylsk Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 60; losses, 65.
Schilder-Schuldner, General, mentioned, 2+; ordered to advance, 43; criticised, 50; at first battle of Plevna, 57.
Schnitnikoff, General, at second battle of Plevna, 108; commands the fifth sector of the investment, 184.
Serpuchoff Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 59; losses, 65, in sup- port of left wing, 73; at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of Plevna, 108.
Shakofskoi, General, at first battle of Plevna, 55.
Shernosuboff, General, on the left bank of the Vid, 141.
Shestakoff, at second battle of Plevna, 114.
Shipka pass, mentioned, 13, 17, 38.
Shuja Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 61; losses, 65; at sortie of August 31st, 75; at capture of Lovtcha, 83; at second battle of Plevna, 108.
Skobeleff, General, attacks the "Green Hills," 30; at first battle of Plevna, 55; his use of the three arms, 74; at capture of Lovtcha, 83; at second battle of Plevna, 98; commands a sector of the invest- ment, 182; at the last .sortie, 189; his handling of artillery, 223.
Snider rifles, used by the Turks, 211.
South Army, mentioned, 9.
btalkenberg, Colonel, mentioned, 143.
8 Index.
Sulienian Pasha, mentioned, 11, 17.
Susdal Regiment, at sortie on August 31st, 75; at second battle of
Plevna, 101. Tamboff Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 57; at second battle of
Plevna, 108. Tcherkass, Colonel, mentioned, 147. Tcherkesses, mentioned, 11, 22; on the left bank of the Vid, 1.37; at
Gorni Dubnik, 161; at Telis, 169; numbers of, 215. Tchermat, General, commander-in-chief of the Roumanian Army, 46;
commanding a sector of the line of investment, 181. Tebjanik, General, at second battle of Plevna, 114; wounded, 123. Telis, use of artiller\' at, 223. Tetewen pass, mentioned, 92. "Three Wells," mentioned, 95.
Todleben, General, "assistant" to the commander-in-chief, 154; pre- pares the investment of Plevna, 181. Trajan's wall, mentioned, 12. Trojan pass, mentioned, 37.
Turkish Army, mentioned, 10; strength at the end of August, 10, 81. Turkish cavalry on the left bank of the Vid, 136. Tutolmin, Colonel, at first battle of Plevna, 63; on the left bank of
the Vid, 143. Uglitz Regiment, at sortie on August 31st, 75; at second battle of
Plevna, 108. Vladi Caucasian Regiment, on the left bank of the Vid, 145. Vladimir Regiment, at sortie of August 31st, 76; at second battle of
Plevna, 109. West Army, strength of Russian, 30; strength at end of August, 81. Widdin, mentioned, 23.
Wilhelminoff, General, at first battle of Plevna, 55 Wologda Regiment, before Plevna on July 19th, 43; in action of July
20th, 46; losses on July 20th. 49; criticised, 52; at first battle of
Plevna, 57; supports attack, 71; at second battle of Plevna, 106; at
the last sortie, 185. Woronesh Regiment, at first battle of Plevna, 60; at second battle of
Plevna, 108. Zeddeler, General, at Gorni Dubnik, 159. Zgalevitza, sortie on August 31st, 28, 75; position of troops before, 75;
Turkish attack on, 76; Turkish repulse at, 78; Russian pursuit, 79;
losses at, 80; comments, 80. Zimmerman, General, mentioned, 12. Zotoff, General, commmands the Russian West Army, 27; at sortie of
August 31 9t, 76; chief of staff, 100; at second battle of Plevna, 121;
commands a sector of the investment, 182.
The Damihe Canijmif/v.
PART I.
IXTKODUCTORY REVIEW OF THE DANUBE CAMPAIGN.
The army designated to operate against European Tur- key, and called the Army of the South, was commanded by the Grand Duke Nicholas and consisted of the YIIL, IX., XI., and XII. Corps of t\v(> infantry and one cayalry diyision each, of the 4th Rifle Brigade, a combined Cossack diyision, and a. number of separate Cossack regiments attached to the corps and diyisions. On April 24th the Army began to cross Mie Roumanian frontier, and (•omi)leted its strategic deployment along the Danube during the ensuing month, mostly by marching and to a smaller extent l)y the use of the railroad, which was largely occupied hj the transport of the heayy artillery, the pontoon ])arks, and other stores of munitions and proyisions.
^^'hile the greater part of the cayalry held the line of the Danube from the mouth of the Aluta downward, the main body of the army stood toward the end of May in the yicinity of Bucharest, the right wing at Slatina on the Aluta, the left wing at Oltenitza on the Danube, On the lower Danube was one diyision of the XI. Corps, strength- ened by a. detachment of the ^'II. Corps, which latter, to- gether with the X. Corps, constituted the Coast Army for the pi'otection of the northern shores of the Black !r>ea.
10 T<i<-tic<il Shidiix oil the lidfth s Around I'lcina.
Of three other corps also mobilized and assigned to the fiekl army, the XIV. Corps was directed to- advance to the lower Danube and relieve there the division of the XL Corps wiiich was to rejoin the main army, while the IV. and XIIL Corps were to join tlit^ main army directly. Political reasons preventedtlieRonmanian Army fr;)m active i)articipati()n in the campaiji'n. This force consisted of four divisions posted in Lesser Wallachia, and in a certain sense constituted the right fltuik guard of' the Russian deployment in Greater Wallachia.
On account of the complete absence of any fixed organi- zation of the Turkish army, and on account of the unsettled state of the Turkish Empire, the strength, distribution, and special formation of the Turkish troops can not be given with comx>lete accuracy, although the following round figures may be approximately correct. At the time of the Russiaji passage of the Danube there w^ere:
1. In the (]u ad ri lateral Shumla — Varna — Silistria — Rustehuk, the main (East) army under Kerim Pasha, 100,000 strcmg, of which about 00,000 men may be considered avail- able for field operations;
2. In the Dobrudja, about 10,000 to 15,000 men ;
'A. In Nikopolis, Sistova, and Tirnova, about 10,000 men ;
4. At Widdin, the Western Army under Osman Pasha, 50,000 strong, of which about 40,000 men probably marched toward Plevna at the end of June ;
5. At Sophia, about 20,000 men, a. sort of reserve army,
The JJ(titiih( < '(niijKii(/ii. 11
for the most pai't a,lso niaitliin^' to Plevna to join Osnian Pasha;
G. South of the Balkans, on the line Philii)i>opolis — Adi'ia.n(>i)le, sonu^ 10,000 to 15,000 uwu iindtM- Ivcui' I'aslui, will) (lid not assnnu' actual conunand until aftci- thr tirst passages of the I^alkans by tlu^ Russians;
7. About 30,000 men under Suleiman I'asha, which had been put in motion towai-<l Kounudia from the theater of war in ^NIontenegTO ;
S. The reinforcements of regular troo]»s from Constan- tinople, fr(un distant provinces, and from new organizations which had been formed with considerable zeal and skill, are estimated at not h^ss than 40,000 nn^n. Most nf tlu^se were scmt to Suleiman Pa.sha.'s army.
The Tcherkesses,a.n irregular but excellent light cavalry, numbering about 20,000 men, are included in the above data. The Mustahaiiz or National Guard are not included, as their militai'y value is doubtful and has not yet been tested in actual conflict Avitli Russian troops.
On the side of the Russians the infantry divisions may be put down at 10,000 men, the cavalry divisions at 2,'M) horses, the Cotssack regiments at 500 horses; the entire tield army of seren coiq^s is therefore to be estimated at about 150,000 in- fantry, 25,000 cavalry, 20,000 special troops, and 800 field guns; in. a<l<li1ion there was a. siege jtarlc of ."MO hea\y and medium guns.
The R(Minianian Army, so far as lit for the held. ina>- be estimated at 40,000 men.
12 Tdclival l^ludie-'i on (he Batilvs AroumI Plrnia.
Active pperations suffered a further poslponemeut of four weeks through the unusually high and long-continued rise of tJie Danube; the delay in the arrival of the large masses of bridging material required, due to defective or- ganization of the Roumanian railways; and the necessity of rendering the Turkish monitor flotilla on the Danube harm- less by the use of batteries and torpedoes.
On the 21st of June General Zimmermann crossed the Danube at Galatz with the head of his (XIV.) corps, and es- tablished himself on the opposite bank after a brisk engage- ment. The remainder of his corps followed during the next few days, and was subsequently joined by a. part of the VII. Corps ; the whole constituted the so-called ^'Column of the Lower Danube," which advanced through the Dobrudja, meeting insignificant resistance on the part of the enemy, and reached Kustendje and Trajan's Wall about the middle €f July. None but small reconnoitering parties crossed this line. Unfavorable sanitary conditions, difficulties of sup- ply and the duty of guarding the shore line, caused the larger portion of the column of 30,000 men to remain inactive in the Dobrudja and to exercise no influence whatever on the operations in Bulgaria beyond. The opposing Turkish troops appear to have been greatly inferior.
We now turn to the main army. On the 27th of June the VIII. Corps crossed the Danube at Zimnitza under a sharp engagement with a Turkish brigade posted at Sistova ; by the 5th of July the IX. and Xni. Corps, the 4th Rifle Bri- gade, the Bulgarian Legion, and the combined Cossa<:'k
Tlic Ddinihc ('(nup(ii(/ii. 13
division had also completed their passage at this point. Anticipatino- somewhat, we note here that by the middh' of July the XL, XII., and IV. Corps were also brought to the right bank.
The Yantra bridge at Biela having fallen into the hands of the Russians on the 3d of July, General Gourko occupied Tirnova on the 8th of July v^dth a mixed advance guard, crossed the Balkans from here by the trail to the east of the Shipka pass, reached the village of Hankioi at the southern foot of the mountains on the 14th, and turned westward, took Kazanlyk <m July ITlh, whn-c lir found liimsolf in tli<' rear of the Shipka pass, which was unsuccessfully attacked on the same day by a detachment of the VIII. Corps coming from Gabrova. The appearance of Gourko in rear of their position caused the weak Turkish garrison to evacuate the pass on the 19th without resistance, and to i-ctreat by side paths. One of the principal l.alkau passes was thus in Russian hands.
Grand Headquai'ters was moved from Sistova to Biela on the 8th of July, and thence to TirnoA'a on the 17th.
Tlie passage of the Balkans divided the Russian army of operation in Bulgaria into three separate groups: the cen- ter, consisting of th(^ N'lII. Coips ;ind Goui-ki)"s mixed ad- vance guard, operated in the P.alkiUis and f«»r sonic linio also to the south of them; the loft wing, ronsistiiig <»f the XII. and XIII. Corps, charged with the investment and siege of Rustchuk and placed under the orders of the Czarowitz, extended along the Lorn from the Danube to Osman-Bazar,
14 Tdcticdl Sftnlics on the lUtttki^ Around I'lcrna.
Willi headquarters at Kadikioi. The ri<iht winj?, consisting of the IX, Corps, under (xeneral Ivrudeiier,\vas cliarged in the first ])lace with takinjr Nikopolis, j^niarding the line Nikopolis — Phmia. — Lo^'tcha, and establishinj; eomniunica- tion from the latter place with the center in the Balkans, The IV. and XI. Corps were at this time in the act of c.ross- ing: the Danube.
Meanwhile General Kriidener with the IX. Cwps had moved on Nikopolis. On the loth of July the commandinji' and strong^ly fortified positions in front of the x>l^ce were taken by assault, and ol the Kith the o^arrison capitulated.
(>sman Pasha, who marched from Widdin with his oorx)S about the end of June, had in the meantime- reached Plevna without being discovered by the Russians. A weak detacliment of the IX, Corjis dispatched against this place on the 20th of July was repulsed with considerable loss.
The un<'xpected api>earance of this strong Turkish army in the space between the \\(l and the Osma caused a com- plete change in tlie situation.
Kriidener, with the IX, Corps reinforced by a brigade of the XI, and a division of the I^", Corps, attacked Plevna on the 30th of July and sutfered a heavy defeat,
Osman Pasha ^'a.s pre■^'ented, probably by the deficient character of his army, from acting on the offensive and reap- ing the fruits of his victory, and the Russian communica- tions by way of Sistova, senously menaced at first, remained undisturbed, XeverthelesS( the Russian offensive had not only been checked for the present, but the Russians were
The Duniihe Ca»}piii(/ii. 15
obliged to make retrograde raovemeuts in the center and on both, flanks.
On the left the Czaro\\itz. whose forces had been angmented by a. part of the XI. Corps, raised th<' invest- iinent of Knstchuk and took a defensive position along the Black Lorn against the Tnrkish army assembling in his front. After his snccessful passage of the Balkans, (Jonrko extended his troops in the Tundja valley, called the Bul- garians to arms, spread terror and confusion as far as IMiil- ippopolis and Adrianople. He was defeated at Eski-Zagra on the 31st of July and compelled to retreat to Kazaulyk. by Suleiman I'asha., who had brought his corx)s, heretofore em- ployed against ^Montenegro, by water from Antivari to Ded- eag at the mouth of the Maritza, thence by rail to Adriano- ple, and had advanced from the latter ]»la('e norllnvard by forced marches. The ^'ITI. Corps, originally designated to follow Gourko across the Balkans, could no longer be em- ployed in the hitter's support, on account of the unfavorable situation north of the Balkans. He therefore evacuated Kazanlyk on the 6th of August and withdrew into the Bal- kan pasises, w'here he entrenched himself.
Cri'and Headquarters was moved back from Tiriio\a to l>iela.. The unfavoi'abh' situation liad dcinoiisiralcd to the Russian leaders that the forces employed were une(iual to the task, and the attempt was made to remedy this evil in two ways: ftret., reinforcements of ten infantry divisions (five Line, three Guard, two Grenadier) and two cavalry di\isions (Gua.rd) were ordered from Kussia; second, a
16 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
treaty (lieretofore refused by Russia) was concluded with Roumauia, which made the Roumanian army available for use in active operations. The West Army, consisting of the I\\ and IX, Corps, was augmented by the entire Roumanian army and the Guards and Grenadiers which arrived later, and the command w^as conferred on Prince Charles of Rou- mania. The remaining three Russian infantry divisions were assignedtothe East Army under the Czarowitz, as also those parts of the XI. Corpsnotheretoforesoassigned. Gen- eral Radetzki, with part of the former advance guard and the VIII. Corps, foi'med the center in the Balkans and con- nected the two rtank aniiies, which were ijosted with their backs toward each other.
For the present the West Army left one Roumanian division, and the East Army left several Russian bodies, on the north bank of the Danube opposite the Turkish fort- resses.
The reinforcements ordered had not arrived when at the beginning of August the three Turkish armies — the West Army under Osman Pasha at Plevna, the South Army under Suleiman Pashaat Kazanly k, the East Army under Mehemed Ali Pasha on the line Razgrad — Osman-Bazar — were in readiness to advance to a concentric attack. The Russian Army, which was posted between the Osma, the Lom, and the Balkansin the triangle Xikopolis — Gabrova^ — Rustchuk, was shaken by its reverses, and in an undoubted critical po- sition, having to rely for weeks, until the arrival of consider- able reinforcements, on its own strength, which had been recognized as insufficient.
Thv Danuhe Canipaifju. 17
Even the splendid bravery manifested by the Russian troops on ever}- occasion would hardly have saved the aiiuy from heavy reverses, had not a certain unwieldiness of the Turkish Army in offensive movements, as well as lack of har- mony, and even open enmity, between the Turkish leaders, acted in favor of the Russians.
Instead of utilizin<i- the open ])asses to the east of Shipka and advancing- with the nuiin body of his army, consisting- of battle-tried elite battalions, against the line Osman-Bazar — Tirn<iva in cooiteiation with tlu^ P]ast Ai-uiy, Suleiman Pasha wasted his strength for six days in heroic but useless attacks against the position in the Shipka pass, which was defended by an opponent equally heroic, though much infeiior in strength. His heavy losses (more tlian 15,000 men, according to Turkish statements) rendered SuleimaJi's amiy unfit for active operations, at least foi' the presemt. It was not until September 17th, and after com- plete reorganization of his troops and considerable acces- sions of reinforcements, that he undertook another' unex- I>ected attack on the Shipka pass, which, though successful at first, was repulsed in the end.
During this time MelicuKMl Ali advanced from Razgrad against the Russian position on the Kara Lom.
After several small engagements, a detachment of the Russian center was defeated at Kara-Hassan kioi on the right bank of the Kara. Lom on the -Slst of August, another was beaten at Kazeljewo on the 5tli of September and ])nslied over the Lom, whose right bank was completely in the hands
18 Tactical t<tudics on the Battles Around Plevna.
of the Turks on Se])tembei" 7tli. To defend tlie line of the Jjintrji. tJie Russian East Anny took j)osition on the right banlc of tlie stream on the phiteau between tlie Jantra and the Bajiizka Lorn (left brajich of the Kara. Loni). On the 13th of September Mehemed Ali crossed to the left bank of the Kara Lorn, defeated a Russian detachment at Sinaiikioi on the 14th, and on September 21st made an unsuccessful attempt to force a pasisage oyer the Banizka Lom at Tschir- kowna. Repulsed with considerable loss. Mehemed Ali re- crossed the Kara Lom, whose pasisages from Kazeljewo downward as far a-s Pyrgos were reoccupied by the Russians by the middle of October.
Osman Pasha's inactivity throughout is surprising. By his unexpected approach from Vk'iddin and his tactical skill in the defensive actions during July he had made his appear- ance on the field of war in splendid manner, and decisive action might have been expected on his part. An insignifi- cant advance from IMevna westward on the 14th of August and another feeble unsuccessful attack from Lovtcha against Selvi on the 21st and 22d of August are not to be taken for seriously contemplated aggressive movements. Still the coincidence in time of the latter attack with the be- ginning of the great attack on the Shipka. pass by Suleinuui Pasha, as well as with the advance of Mehemed Ali against the upper Lom, is worth noting. More seriously contem- plated and more vigorously carried out was Osman Pasha's attack against the Russian positions at Zgalevitza and Pel- ishat on the 31st of August; but this attack was likewise
Tlw Ddiiuhe C(nni)<ii(/ii. 19
undertaken with but half of the avaihible forces, and is not to be considered as a last struggle for final decision. Coin- cident again with Osmaii's attack was Mehemed Ali's ad- vance against the middle Loni, while Suleiman was still en- gaged in reorganizing his army, which was shattered and un- able to cooijerate with the aggressive movements of the two flank armies.
^Vhile tile Kussians were restricting themselves in the Balkans and on the Lorn to the defense of their partly main- tained and reoccupied positions, tlie West Army, reinforced by two Russian infantry divisions and the Roumanians, jiro- ceeded to the serious attack on IMevna,
After the capture of Lovtcha on the 3d of September, the great artillery attack against Plevna opened on the 7th, and continued for some time after the great assault on the lltli of September, which, though in part successful, must be accounted a failure.
The attempt to deprive the Army of Plevna of its com- munications with Widdin and Sophia, l)y ]>osting a strong cavalry corps on the left bank of the Vid was without result for a tinia Reinforcements with considerable supplies of provisions and munitions repeatedl}' broke through the weak line of investment on the left bank, and succeeded in getting int(> Plevna. The investnicnl of Plcxiia did not be- come effective and make itself felt until after General Gourko assumed command of the corps of imcslnicnt (tn the left bank of the Vid with trooi>s of the (Juard, and had established himself on the line of communication and retreat
20 Tacticdl Sttidivx on the Battles Around Plevna.
of tlie Ai'iny of Plevna. After the capture b}^ assault of tlie fortified station of Gorni Dubnik, provisions and ammunition ran short in Plevna.
Russian detachments which were pushed into the mountains along the Isker and Vid cut off Mehemed Ali's reserve army assembling at Sophia and compelled it to be more solicitous of its own defense than of the relief of Plevna. •
Deprived of hope of assistance from without and pressed by the daily increasing difficulties of his position, Osman Pasha attempted to break through the Russian line of investment westward on the 10th of December; the at- tempt failed, and Osman Pasha and his entire army sur- I'endered as prisoners of war.
It remains to cast a brief glance at the coincident events on the Lom. where the Russian East Army, after reoccupy- ing the line of the Kara Lom, remained strictly on the defensive.
Suleiman Pasha, who had assumed command of the Turkish East Army about the middle of October, in place of Mehenled Ali Pasha, attempted to draw the attention of the Russians to their own left flank by attacking the lower Lom on the 19th and 26th of Xovember, and seriously and unex- pectedly attacked the extreme right of the Russian position in the mountains at Maren and Elena, on the 4th of Decem- ber, with .30,000 men. The feeble Russian detachment was driven ba;Ck with severe loss in men and guns, but in rear of Elena the Turkish advance came to a stop, and on receipt
The Danube Campaign. 21
of the news of the surrender of Plevna the Turkish corps withdrew toward Achmedli on the 14th of December. On December 12th the Turlcs suffered a bloody repulse at Met- schka on the lower Loni. where they made a vigorous at- tack. With the fall of Plevna, almost coincident Avith the end of the year, the campaign on the Danube terminated ; all subsequent events on the various portions of the theater of war pertain to a new period, the campaign of Adrianople.
22 Tactical Studies oii the Battles Around PUvna.
PART n.
REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS AROUND PLEVNA.
The opevatious of the IX. Corps, wliich constituted the nucleus of the su'bsequently formed West Army, began July IStli with the assault on the heights commanding Nikopolis and the surrender of the fortress on the 16th.
Dur-ing the struggle at Nikopolis the Caucasian Cos- sack .Brigade was pushed into the space between the Osma and Vid, to cover the IX. Coi*ps against anj^ hostile enter- prises from Rah ova and Plevna; according to the statements of prisoners, the garrison of Nikopolis did in fact expect relief from tiie west.
During the night of the IStli-lGth the Cossack Brigade had an action with a detacJmient of Turkish infantry which seemed to belong to the garrison of Nikopolis and to have escaped from the impending capitulation. No hostile bodies made their appearance from the west in these days.
But on the 17th one of the recounoitering parties dis- patched to tlie south encountered at Selvi a detachment of about 1,000 men, consisting of Tcherkesses and Bashi- bozouks "s\ith some infantin, which retired on Lovtcha. (^n the evening of the same day reports ai'rived at Grand Head- quarters, from the (Cossack pati'ols scouting along the '^^id, of the approach of sti-ong hostile detachme<nt.s from the
Operations Aronitd Phviui- 23
west, marching iii the direction of IMevmi. It seems that the commander-in-chief phiced little imjjortance on these reports, and certainly did not believt^ in the presence of strong masses of the eni^nv in tluit direction; the only measure taken in this respect was an order to the com- mander of the IX. (''ori)s to occupy Plevna with a. detach- ment and to clear the vicinity of such bodies of the eni^my as might be there.
The fact that the Head(pia.rters rested in such fa.ls(^ security as regards the danger threatening from West r>nl garia does not throw favorable light on the organiza- tion and direction of the service of information. An entire army was assembled at Plevna by this tim(\
The date when Osman I*asha started from \\'iddin with the main body of tJie West Bulgai'ian Army can not be ac- curately ascertained. Su]>posing the movement from Wid- diu to have begiui when the passage of the l)anul>e b.\ the Russians became known. Osman Pasha's army would have consumed about twenty days in traversing the disTanci- of about 125 miles from Widdin to Plevna. The heads of these columns were the troo])s whose presence on the Vid was reported on the 17tli of July by the Cossacks scouting there. In addition, a part of the i-eserve army at Soj)hia was or- dered to join Osnuui. aJid it is ])robablc that this c(»rps took the great road through Orkhanie. and thence eitliei* the load leading from Ttdis to rievua or from .labloni/.a ahmg the northern foot of the Balkans to Plevna; in the foi-mer ca.s<^ the troops with whom the Russians came in touch at Relvi
24 Tdcticdl Studies on the Battles Around Pl( ritd.
(Ill the ITth may be considerd as the right flank guard, aud iu the hitter case as the advance guard of the corps ap- proaching from Sophia.
Nothing is Icnown with certainty of the phm on whicli Osman's march was originally based; had he arrived on the banks of the Vid a few^ days earlier, the capture of Nikopolis by the Russian IX. Corps would hardly have been possible.
^^'e now again turn to the operations of the Russian Army.
Pursuant to instructions from the Headquarters, Gen- eral Kriidener on the 18th of July ordered the commander of the .5th Infantry Division, Lieutenant-General Schilder- Schuldner, to move with the 1st Brigade of his division, 4 batteries, and the 9th Don Cossack Regiment from Mkopolis to Plevna, and to occupy the place. The troops already be- yond the Osma and along the highroad from Bulgareni to Plevna — the Kostroma Regiment of the .5th Division with a battery and the Caucasian Cossack Brigade — were ordered to cooperate in the enterprise and placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner.
The latter permitted the two detachments to advance separately from north and east against Plevna, where mean- w'hile a large part of Osman's armj^, probably not less than 20.000 to 25,000 men, had arrived, and he suffered a bloody defeat on the 20th of July, the three infantry regiments losing .3,000 men, one-third of their proper strength.
The vigorous sign of life given by the hitherto neglected arnw of Osman made a very unpleasant impression at Head-
Oixrailons Around Plevna- 25
quarters, occupied at tins moment bv Gourko's surprisingly successful passage of tlie Balkans, and probably engaged in plans of an immediate advance on Adrianople. The un- favorable impression produced by the defeat at Plevna was to be wiped out as quickly as possible by overpowering the troublesome opponent. General Kriidener received consid- erable reinforcements from the corps recently brought to the right bank of the Danube, and was enjoined to attack Plevna vigorously.
General Kriidener had meanwhile been concentrating his IX. Corps at P.resljaniza; but one regiment Avas left at Nikopolis, which place received a Roumanian garrison in addition.
Up to July 2Gth Kriidener received the following rein- forcements: the 1st Brigade of the 32d Infantry Division and the 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, both of the XL Corps and under the personal command of Prince Sha- kofskoi, the corps commander; also the 30th Infantry Di- vision of the IV. Corps.
Lovtcha, temporarily occupied by a Russian detachment, was recovered by the Turks on July 2Gth, whO' at this jioint were distant 50 miles from the headquarters at Tirnova and 37 from Gabrova at the northern issue of the Shipka pass.
Kriidener's total strength, including the reinforce- ments and deducting losses, amounted to about 30,000 men with 170 gun's. He had some hesitation in attacking the enemv a.t IMevna, belicvinir his own forces insufficient in
26 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
view of the enemy's stroiio- positiou and large force, for b}' the end of Jul^' Osmau Pasha must have had more than 40,000 men with about 80 guns at Plevna. Reiterated or- ders from Headquarters prompted him finally to jjroceed to the attack on the 30th of July. The battle was contested on both sides with great bravery, but terminated in a heavy defeat of the Russians, who lost 7,500 men in killed and wounded, which was one-fourth of their effectives.
Strange to say, there was no pursuit on the i^art of the Turks; thereby the Russian troops, which were much de- moralized immediately after the unsuccessful termination of the struggle, gained time to make front in good condition on the line Trestenik — Poradim, bareh' 13 miles from the battle-field.
A pause now- ensued in front of Plevna. Prevented by some cause — probably by the defective character of his army — from turning his victory to full account by a vigorous attack on the Russian communications, Osman Pasha occu- pied himself with strengthening his position by means of fortifications and converted it into a spacious, extremely strong, entrenched camp, to which it seems a number of heavy guns of position w^ere en route from Widdin. The only sign of life given by the Turkish army at Plevna was a feeble reconnaissance westw^ard on the lltli of August, which was driven back by the fire of Russian guns, and a movement from Lovtcha on Selvi, which was undertaken on the 21st and 22d of August with small forces, without en- ergy, and therefore without result.
Operations Around Plevna. 27
The Eussiaas passed tlie entire mouth of August iu a waiting attitude; the arrival of the reinforcements ordered Mas awaited with impatience, and it was a matter of grati- fication that the Turks did not proceed from Plevna to the attack of the line of the Jantra, The portion of the XI. Corps which had been present before Plevna since the end of Juh' was detached from the West Ami}- and employed farther to the east; in its place the entire IV, Corps and the 4th Roumanian Division were assigned to' this army, now commanded by General Zototf, the commander of the IV. Corps and senior general present; the 4th Roumanian Division, which rested on the Vid at Riben, formed the right wing, the IX. Corps nor-th of the highroad to Bulgareni formed the center, and the IV, Corps south of the highroad formed the left wing of the position.
After the completion of the diplomatic formalities and military agreements, the main body of tlie RoumaJiiau Anuy (i. €., the 2d and 3d Divisions) crossed the Danube at Kora- bia (22 miles above Xikopolis) during the last days of August. The 1st Division remained opposite Widdin. The selection of the point of crossing raises the presumption that the Rou- manians were to operate on the left bank of the \Ui and to invest Plevna from the west, but after a few days the two Roumanian divisions were brought to the right bank of the Vid. The Roumanian Army of three divisions now consti- tuted the right wing of the ^^'est Army, over which Prince Charles of Roumania assumed command, the previous com- mander, Geaieral Zototf, becoming his chief of staff.
28 Taciicfil ^^liidics: o)) the Jintths Aroiiiid Plcnid.
On the 31st of August, previous to the arrival of the Roumanian Army on the right banlc of the Vid, Osman Pasha made a vigorous attack, south of the Bulgareni road, with some 25,000 men, against the left of the Russian posi- tions at Zgalevitza and Telisliat. He was rejtulsed after a long and doubtful struggle, with a loss of several thousand killed and wounded; the Russians lost 1,000 men.
The period from the beginning of August to the begin- ning of September, which, aside from the action of Pelishat, was broken by no noteworthy event, was utilized by the Russians for various preparations for the great attack con- templated upon the arrival of reinforcements.
The first of these measures was a thorough reconnais- sance of the ground, which was ver^- much broken and well covered by the fire of the Turks. But an accurate survey on the scale of three inches to the mile was nevertheless made, and the resulting map was manifolded and distrib- uted among the troops.
Fascines, gabions, and scaling ladders were also pre- pared, and the troops practiced in escalade; approaches to the enemy's position as well as lateral communications M'ere built; many large and small bridges were repaired or newly constructed; the existing wells were cleaned and a number of ninv (uies sunk.particuiarlv at suchpointsas v.i're designed tO' serve as future dressing stations; lastly, a number of siege guns were brought uj), ]»artly iu. order lo employ heavy calibers against the Turkish position, partly to give a moral support to the troops, which had lost confi-
Operntioiis Aroiin<] PIciiki. 29
dejioe ill the field artillery iii the uctioii against the Turkish works.
At the begiiiiiing of September the long-expected rein- forcements arrived. They consisted of the main body of the Roumanian Army, which was posted on the right; part of the cavalry of Gourko's former advance guard, two Dra- goon regiments, oiie Hussar regiment, and twO' Don Cossack regiments; the siege artillery of 20 tw^enty-four-pounders; lastly, on the 5th of September General Prince Imeretinski, with the 2d Infantry Division and the 3d Rifle Brigade, ar- rived from Lovtcha, which he had taken by assault on Sep- tember 3d, after an obstinate and bloody struggle, which severed the communications of Plevna to the southeast; his detachment for the present took position in rear of the left of the IV. Corps.
The Rnssian army before IMevna now numbered five infantry divisions and one ritle brigade, a total of sixty-four battalions. But it may be safely assumed tliat the battal- ions crossed the Danube witli not more than 800 elfectives, and it is not probable that the ranks could have been filled with recruits by the beginning of September. The losses of the loth, 20th, and 30th of July and 31st of August and at Lovtcha amounted to some 12,000 men, wLih; the loss from sickness dnriug .July and Augusl must at a mod(n*ate calciilalion l)e jiIactMl at several thousiuid men, so tliat the number of elfectives of the Russian infantry before IMevna could hardly have been more than 35,000 and certainly not more than 40,000 men. If we add the artillery, cavalry, and
30 Tacticul ^hidks on the Battles Around Plcrna.
engineer troops, the total of the Russian West Army was at the most 50,000 ell'ectives, to which some 25,000 Roumanians should be added.
The number of effectives of the Turkish, army assembled at Plevna was probably about 50,000 men, after making allowance for the losses suffered in July and August and counting reinforcements.
During the night of the 6th-7th of September the Rus- sian troops approached in deep silence mthin gun-shot of the Turkish works and threw up entrenchments for their artillery and covei' for part of the infantry. On the morn- ing of the 7th fire was opened on the Turkish positions and continued until noon of the 11th — almost without any effect whateA-er, as will be seen later on. On the left General Skobeleff began kis assault on the "Green Hills" on the 8th, and made himself master of the southern portion of that irapoi'tant point in a bloody struggle of three days. At 3 p. m. on the 11th of September a general assault was made; on the right by the Roumanians and the IX. Corps against the Grivitza works, in the center by the IV. Corps against the Radischevo works, on the left by Skobeleff's combined corps against the Krishin works.
The attack in the center was repulsed; on the' right the most advanced Grivitza. redoubt, on the left the nortliern portion o^f the "Green Hills" and two redoubts of the Krishin works, fell into the hands of the Russians.
The Grivitza redoubt was the only one, however, that remained in Russian liands; after a furious struggle and
Operations Anmml Plevna. 31
under great losses ou both sides, the Turks made a counter- stroke in force, regained the redoubts on the left, and also drove the Russians from the "Green Hills."
As it soon became clear that the captured redoubt, which had been considered the key point of the hostile posi- tion, was completely overlooked by the works hing farther to the rear, the assault, which cost the Russians about 12,500 and the Roumanians about 3,000 men, may be consid- ered a total failure.
Ujjon the unsuccessful and costly issue of this assault the Russians abandoned the idea of taking Plevna by assault, and decided upon the conquest of Osman Pasha's army by means of investment and starvation. The center of gravity of the events was thus shifted from the right to the left bank of the Vid.
On the 8th of September General Loshkaretf crossed to the left ba.nk with eight regiments of lUissian and Rou- manian cavalry and made sevea\al scouting expeditions. On the 10th General Krylotf took command of all cavalry corps on the left bank, but was unablei to effectually check the march of Turkish trains and reinforcements from Sophia on the road Orkha.nic^ — Telis — Gonii Dnbnik.and the whole attempt to invest Plevna from the west is to be accounted a. complete failure.
In this quarter the investment did n;)t become effective until the arrival of the Guards and Grenadiers, which for the greater part were assigned to the ojxM'ations on the west side. On the 24th of October General Gonrko willi greatly
32 Tdrficdl »S7//f//('.s' OH the Btifflcs Around Plcrim.
superior foiccs nssMulted and took Gorni Uubuik, a sti-ongiy fortified point on the line of communications which, was bravely defended by a few thousand men. Tells fell into the hands of the Russians on October 2Sth, after a slight en- gagement, and Dolui Dubnik on November 1st, without re- sistance. The line of investment on the west of Plevna was then completed by the building of a series of stron;4 en- trenchments.
All communications of the army in Plevna were now severed; moreover, to deprive it of any hope of relief by Mehemed All's army, which was assembling at Sophia and whose advance guard had reached Orkhanie, strong Eussian detachments were pushed to the west and south.
Toward the west A'ratza was taken on the 9th of Novem- ber, Rahova on the 22d, and Lom-Palanka on the 30th. On December 1st, Hying detachments advanced toward the di- rect line of ctmimnnication with the Servians.
Toward the south Teteven (on the upper Vid) was occu- pied on the 2d and the Rosalita pass (on the upper Osma) on the 17th of November; on the 23d strong detachments took Prawez, between Orkhanie and Etropol, and on the 24:th the latter place itself, whereupon the Turkish advance guard at Orlvhanie fell back on the main body at Sophia.
Reverting now to the events on the east front of Plevna, we have stated above that no decisive importance attaches to tliem after the middle of September; the question here for the Russians was partly one of holding their positions, partly of gradually advancing the line of investment so as to shorten it somewhat.
Ojxrdtioiis AiokikI l^hrim. '6'A
On the 17tb of September a.u attempt ou the part ef the Turks to retake the "first" Orivitza redoubt was repulsed; on the following- day an attempt on the part of the Kouma- nians to take the so-called ^'second'' Grivitza redoubt also failed, whereupon trenches were resorted to for the approach on the Turkish positions, the artillery meanwhile maintain- ing a slow fire, which failed to elicit any reply from the Turks.
After pushing- their trenches to within thirty yards of the enemy's redoubt, the Roumanians made a dash at it on the 19th of October, but were flung back with great loss.
On the left General Skobeleff occupied the village of Brestovetz on the night of November Ith-oth, seized the "first knoir' of the "Green Hills'' on November !)tli. and maintained himself in the rapidly entrenched position against two hostile assiiults launched against it by the Turks on the 12th and 15th of November. The complete investment of Plevna meanwhile made itself felt ; munitions and provisions began to fail, and disease made great rav- ages auumg the troops, which were poorly fed, clothed, and housed. The hope of relief from without diminished more and more, and Osman Pasha was at last compelled to relin- quish his stout and prdtracted resistance.
The attem]»t undertaken with great l)ravei*y on Decem- ber 10th, of breaking through the Russian line (»f iuvt^st- ment on the west where it was held by two Grenadier divis- ions, seemed to be without hope of success and merely for the sake of sji.ving tJie luMior of the Turkish arms. Ou the I'a.ilure of the attack, and after the loss of the pai-tly aliaJi-
34 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
doued and weakl}- held works on the east, Osman Pasha surrendered uncouditionally with his entire army, whose effectives may still have numbered some 40,000 men, not counting some 20,000 sick and wounded.
For nearly five months Osman^ Pasha and his army maintained themselves against a constantly increasing oj)- ponent and under the apparently overwhelming fire of a formidable artillery. The entire situation was altered by this obstinate resistance, and the decision of the cam- paign, which at one time seemed to become ripe dm'ing the year of 1877, w^as staved off until 1878. The results gained by Osman Pasha and his army may therefore be justly re- garded as surpassing their own expectations.
On the other hand, it cannet be denied that the re- peated reverses suffered at Plevna helped toward the Rus- sian final success. Timely attention was called to the de- fective character of the -whole Russian plan of operation, and much greater forces than originally contemplated were brought to the theater of war, which rendered a. subsequent successful and decisive conduct of the war possible.
Had the Russian Army succeeded in reaching Adrian- ople in August, 1877, without the interlude of Plevna, peace might have been made under stipulations much more ac- ceptable to Turkey than those now to be expected.
Plevna. 35
PART in.
PLEVNA.
1. Geographical Conditions.
Plevna is situated in the center of a great agricultural district on the great road from Sophia to Rustchuk, in the valley of the Tutchenitza brook, a right branch of the Vid. From here radiate important roads to Nikopolis in the north, Widdin in the west, to Orkhanie and Sophia in the south- west, to Lovtcha and Trojan in the south, to Selvi and Tir- nova in the southeast, and lai^tly, as previously stated, to Biela and Rustchuk in the east.
Appreciating the importance of Plevna as an industrial and commercial center, Midhat Pasha, the former Governor- General of the Danube Province (Tuna-Vilajet), decided to connect the town with the Danube by railway.
Nikopolis was at first intended to be the terminus of the I'oad; but closer examination showed this place unsuited for a commercial depot and the requisite harbor construc- tion, and Midhat decided to establish a new commercial center, to be named 'Tort Sultanie," at the mouth of the Osma, west of Nikopolis. From this latter place the road was to ascend the valley of the Osma for some distance and reach Plevna by way of Metchka, Kojulowza, and Griv- itza. For the construction of the road-bed. which consisted
30 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
for liie most part of fillings, Midhat Pasha collected some 20,000 Bulgarian laborers; the requisite timber was taken from the forests at the foot of the Balkans.
4
Soon afterward Midhat was recalled from his position, the enterprise was allowed to lapse, and few vestiges of the work remain.
We will now examine the communications radiating from I'levna:
(a) From Plevna to Nikopolls, 25 miles, by way of Caly- sovat and Bresljaniza.
(6) From Plevna to Widdin. — The road from Plevna to Rahova is 35 miles across the deep valleys of the Isker and its branches.
Rahova is a Bulgarian commercial town, situated in a narrow, level valley between receding mountains. The Turks had constructed some redoubts on the surrounding heights in order to make it serve as a poist on the communi- cations betvN'een Plevna and Widdin. The distance from Rahova to Lom-Palanka on the Danube is 35 miles, and from there is Widdin is also 35 miles.
A good road leads southward from Rahova to Vratza (40 miles); from Yratza there is a direct road to Plevna (60 miles), which crosses to the left bank of the Isker and fol- lows that stream in its further course. All the roads named, except thehighroad Rahova — Vratza, are country roads which cross the deep-cut valleys of the Ogost, Isker, and Skit at various points.
(c) The Great Road from Plevna to Orhhanie and Sophia
Plevna. 37
was built during Midbat Paslia's governorsliip. and sui- passes most of the Turkish roads in being well paved and wide enough to permit two four-horse wagons to pass each otheratany point; a telegraph line follows the road through- out its lengih.
From Plevna the road runs westward, crosses the Md (3 miles), runs southwesterly across undulating ground to Dolni (Lower) Dubnik (0 miles) and Telis (10 miles). sMitli- ward to Lukovitza (9 miles) and Jablonitza (12 miles), west- ward to Orkhanie (20 miles), then soutJnvard to the Balkan pass of Babakonak (12 miles), and from here westward to Sophia (30 miles).
{(!) From Plevna to Lovtcha and Trojan. — From Ple\na to Lo^'tcha (elevation 000 feet) 20 miles, from here upstream along the left bank of the Osma to Trojan (elevation 1,100 feetj also 20 miles. Trojan is situated at the junction of the Balabanka with the Osma and numbers GOO houses with 3,500 inhabitants in a dislT^^'ict almost exclusively inhabited by Bulgarians. South of Trojan is the wealthy liulgarian monastery which was the center of the Bulgarian insurrec- tion of 1807. From Ti-ojan the road leads to the pass of Trojan, which has an eleA'ation of 5,000 feet.
(e) Fi-07n Plevna to Lovtcha and Tirnova. — A highroad runs the entire distance: from IMcvna to Lovtcha. on the Osma 20 miles, from there to Selvi on the Rusitza (left branch ■ of the Jantra) 20 miles, thence to Tirnova on the Jantra 25 miles. From Selvi a road leads southward to the Rosalita pass, whicli has aji elevation of L400 feet and is distant
38 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
from Selvi 30 miles, and 6 miles north, of Kalifer. Tlie Rosalita pass is 25 miles to the west of the Shipka pass.
(/) Frojn Plevna to Rustchnk. — From Plevna the great road (prolongation of the Sophia road) leads to Bulgareni on the Osma (25 miles), thence to Biela on the Jantra (30 miles), and lastly to Rustchuk (25 miles).
2. TopograpMcal Conditions.
Plevna was a well-built town of 17,000 inhabitants, one- half of whom were Mohammedans, with 3,100 houses, 18 mosques, and 2 Christian churches. It is situated on the Tutchenitza brook, 3 miles above its junction with the river Vid. Higher up on the brook lies the village of Tutchenitza, from which the brook derives its name.
Just below Plevna the Tutchenitza brook is joined by the Grivitza brook, which comes from the eaist and is so called from the village of GriWtza on its upper course.
The entire country surrounding Plevna on the east may be divided into three sections : the section north of the Grivitza brook, the ijiiddle section between Grivitza and Tutchenitza brooks, the section between Tutchenitza brook and the Vid river.
The heights skirting the right bank of the Vid closely approach the river at Bivolar and Opanetz in the nortliern and at Oltschages in the southern section; above Plevna the valley of the Tutchenitzia is a steep, narrow ravine, but expands below the town and forms a broad plain enclosed by mountains .on the north and south.
In the northern section the great road Plevna — Bui-
Plevna. 39
gareni — Biela follows the northern bank of the Grivitza. The heights which form the northern edge of the Grivitza amd Tutchenitza brooks, and whose southern slopes are very abrupt, ai-e divided by the ravine of Bukova into a western and eastern portion, the former lying between the ravine named and the Vid river, the latter between the ravine of Bukova and another ravine extending northward from Grivitza.
The plateau forming the section between the Grivitza and Tutchenitza brooks is furrowed by three smaller ra- vines: from Grivitza southward extends the ''southern Grivitza ravine," from the Tutchenitza valley eastward the "Radischevo ravine," and, between the two, from Plevna Boutheastward, the "middle ravine." The eastern edge of the southern Grivitza ravine and the northern edge of the Radischevo ravine were covered with brush and gr()u])s of trees; the slopes of the steep and deep Tutchenitza ravine \v ere covered for the most part with vineyards.
The southern portion of the southern section has be- come known as the "Green Hills," and was thickly covered with trees, vines, and high corn-flelds; to the east it forms three sharply separated knolls, which' are designated from south to north as "first," "second," and "third" knoll; the two depressions inten-ening between the knolls open into the Tutchenitza ravine. The Lovtcha road follows the western edge of the latter ravine and crosses the "Green Hills." The noHhern part of this section between Plevna and the Vid river, and separated from the "Green Hills" by
-iu Tdclicdl Studies on the Battles Around I'lvrnd.
a depression running: east and west, seems to overtop the entire country around Plevna.
From Plevna tlie great road to Sophia follows the left bank of the Tutohenitza to the Vid and crosses that river on a well-constructed wooden bridge, which is 140 paces in length and rests on stone piers.
S. Fortifivdtions. At the beginning of July Plevna was without any forti- fication whatever; about the middle of July, at the time of the first attack, probably but few points of the town itself were prepared for defense, as the monastery at the east- ern exit of the town. Toward the end of July the con- struction of works on the surrounding heights was taken in hand with great energy; at the time of the great attack on July .30th most of the commanding points in the vicinity were entrenched, and subsequently the whole position was thoroughly fortified, partly by the erection of new works, partly by completing and strengthening those already in existence. To the west of the Bukova ravine was the Bukova redoubt (a) ; east of the Bukova. ravine the so-called second Grivitza redoubt (6); close in front of Grivitza the first Grivitza redoubt, also called Abdul Kerim Tabia (c); to the southwest of the last was the eastern Rad- ischevo redoubt, also called Central redoubt or Haflz Bey Tabia (d); further to the west on the edge of the Tutchenitza ravine the western Radischevo redoubt or Tutchenitza redoubt (e); lastly, north of the *'Green Hills" the Krishin redoubt [f). All these works were very large, of very
Plevna. 41
strong profile, and provided in the interior witli large hol- low traverses prepared for artillery defense; in front and on the sides of the redoubts were several lines of rifle- trenches, which, partly by the use of the natural slopes and partly by artificial construction, rendered a defense by tiers of rifle fire possible on a large scale.
In second line were a number of smaller works to guard communication between those works and with the town.
Between the Krishiu redoubt and the town two re- doubts were subsequently built, which were taken and again lost b}' Skobeleft" on the 11th and 12th of September; in rear of the Krishin redoubt was the camp of the Turkish reserves, protected by a number of works.
On the west bank of the Vid a sort of bridge-head was constructed in front of the bridge; the space from there northward to the mouth of the Netropolie brook was covered by two additional works.
Lastly let us quote here a brief description of the exter- nal aspect of the Turkish works as given by an eye-witness. at the beginning of September:
"As viewed from the Russian batteries, the surround- ings of Plevna appeared as a hilly plateau about 5 miles in width, bounded on the right .and left by continuous ridges (the Grivitza heights and tJie "Gr^en Hills"); in the back- ground, hidden in a depression, was Plevna. On first sight the entire plateau offered nothing unusual to the eye; on closer observation, however, a series of entrenchments might be seen which looked like yellowish bands on the gen-
42 Tactical Stmlies on the Battles Around Plevna.
eral green ground. Even with the aid of tlie field-glass, details could not be distinguished; most conspicuous were the three foremost redoubts — on Lhe right the Grivitza Re- doubt, on the left the Radischevo woncs, and farther in rear an entrenched camp."
The Action <if I'ltriia. ^3
PART IV.
THE AC^TION AT PLEVNA ON JULY 20TR
1. Adranrc on Plcriia on Jiilj/ ]t)tJi.
On July IStli Lieutenant-General Schilder-Sclnilduer, commander of the V. Infantry Division, received orders from General Kriidener to advance with two regiments (Arch- angel, No. 17, and Wologda, No. 18) of his division, four batteries, and the 9th Don Cossacks, from Nikopolis on Plevna and to take possession of that place. Additional troops from beyond the Osma were also placed under his orders; at Bulgareni, 25 miles from Nikopolis, ten sotnias* of the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with a battery, also one battalion of the Kostroma Regiment, number 10 ; at Poradim, 12 miles nearer Plevna, the remainder of the 19th Regiment, a battery, and two sotnias of Cossacks.
Oeneral Schilder-Schuldner gave directions to the Kos- troma Regiment to assemble at Poradim, and then to march to Zgalevitza, arriving at 2 p. m. July 19th. The Cossack iBrigade was ordered to nuirch to Tutchenitza.
During the night of -Inly 18tli-l!Mli Liciitcnant-General Schilder-Schuldner bivouacked with tlic infantry brigade and artillerv at the moulh of the Osnia, and arrived on the
"The sotnia is the squadron of the Cossacks. 'I'lit word means "a hiitidred," but the sotnia varies from 100 to 200 men. — A. h. W.
■14 Tactical Sttidies on the Battles Around PIcrna.
afternoon of the 19th before Plevna (21 miles). Finding the place occupied by the Turks, he opened fire from his guns and continued the cannonade until dark, and then went into bivouac in front of the town.
The 9th Don Cossacks had started toward Plevna sepa- rately from the infantry, bivouacked at Riben on ihe night of the 18th-19th, and seem to have remained there during theforenoonof the 19th. While they were cooking, the sound of guns was heard fr.om Plevna (10 miles) about 3 p.m. The camp-kettles were emptied at once, and the regiment marched to within '1^ miles of Plevna, where a small Turkish infantry detachment was encountered. Half a sotnia dismounted and began a fight, which lasted; until dark. Covered by a chain of outposts consisting of two sotnias, the regiment bivouacked in view of Plevna,
The Kostroma Eegiment with the battery and the two attached sotnias reached Zgalevitza at the designated hour and sent both sotnias forward to reconnoiter toward Plevna, In. rear of the village of Grivitza a hostile camp was discov- ered, from which about three hundred men, one infantry battalion, and two guns started to meet the Cossacks, who fell back on their infantry.
On tlie evening of the 19th the troops of Schilder-Schuld- ner were posted in four separate groups as follows:
The 9th Don Cossacks — 6 sotnias — on the extreme right north of Plevna.
The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division— 6 battalions, 32 guns — to the northeast of Plevna.
The Acf ion at Pinna. 45
The Kostroma Regiment — 3 battalions, 2 sotnias, S guns — southeast of rievna at Zgalevitza.
The Cossack Brigade — 10 sotnias, 6 gun» — south of Plevna at Tutchenitza.
The whole detachment, which did not number more than 9,000 men, was in a crescent-shaped position 10 miles in ex- tent, facing a concentrated enemy at least twice its strength. Late in the evening Schilder-Schuldner issued orders for the attack at 5 o'clock on the next morning; the Kostroma Regi- ment received the order at 2 a. m.
2. The Attack on Plevna on July 20th. At 4 a. m. Turkish troops advanced from Plevna against the 9th COiSsacks and opened fire with artillery. The out- posts of the Cossacks were assembled, dismounted, and occupied the edge of a wood on the extreme right. As the Turkish infantry, and artillery advanced against this posi- tion, a report of the situation was dispatched to General Schilder-Schuldner, who sent two infantry companies and a battery to support the regiment. The shrapnel fire of this battery soon caused the Turks to seek cover. Without further engagement both sides remained facing each oth(^r until noon, when the Cossack regiment was ordered to cover the withdrawal of the infantry. The regiment, which had for the most part dismounted to fight on foot, mounted and moved to the left to interpose itself between the withdraw- ing infantry and the enemy; a Turkish cavalry detachment advancing in pursuit was driven back. At 0 ]>. m. the regi- ment was at IJrvslan.
•i<'> Tdcticdl Sfudir.s on the Battles Aroiiitd Plevmi.
The maiu body, posted aloug the road from Nikopolis to Plevua, bi'ou<'iit three batteries into action at 4:45 a. m. against two Turkish batteries; soon afterward the brigade deployed on the west of the road in the following order: to the left of the batteries one battalion of the Archangel Regi- ment, to the right tw^o battalions of the Archangel and two battalions of the Wologda Regiment — all live battalions in two lines of company columns. The rifle company (fifth com- pany of each battalion) was deployed in front as skirmishers; one Wologda battalion with a battery formed the reserve, from which the batter}^ and two companies were soon after- ward dispatched to the extreme right to support the Cossacks.
In front of the Russian position was a ravine which opened into the Vid valley at Riben; the further edge of the ravine was covered with bushes and held by hostile rifle- men; in rear of the ravine w^ere the heights on which the so-called second Grivitza redoubt and the Bukova redoubts were subsequently built.
At 5:30 a. m. the Russians advanced to the attack all along the line; the Archangel Regiment on the left en- countered obstinate resistance and did not make much head- way; the Wologda Regiment on the right and the nearest comiJanies of the Archangel Regiment drove the hostile skirmishers back and reached the town itself, where furious street-fighting began. The Turks brought forward rein- forcement after reinforcement and the losses of the Rus- sians increased at an alarming rate. The brigade commander
The Action at Plevna. 47
was wounded, the commander of the Wologda Regiment was killed, and the commander of the 5th Artillery Brigade, as the senior officer present, assumed command; the posi- tion was held for the present.
Up to 9:30 a. m. (jeneral Schiider-Schuldner was with- out any information of the doings of the Kostroma Regi- ment; at that time he received a report'tliat the commander of the Kostroma Regiment had been killed, and that the attack of the regiment was not making headway. Receiving reports, from several sides, of the total exhaustion and great losses of the troops, and having no reserves at hand, he or- dered the infantry to retire at 11:30 a. ni., the 9th Cossack Regiment to cover the withdrawal of the infantry.
Upon, the witlidrawal of the Archangel and ^\'o]()g(la Regiments, seventeen ammunition carts fell into the hands of the Turks, partly because they were shot to pieces, partly because the teams were killed. The retreating brigade was relieved by the Galitz Regiment (of same division), which was coming up from Nikopolis, and in the evening botli bivouacked at Brysla.n.
At 5 a. m., after a brief preparation by arHUery lire, the Kostroma Regiment advanced to the attack, along ihe high- road from Plevna to Bulgareni, against the height on which subsequently the first Grivitza redoubt (Abdul Kerini Taliiai was built. The regiment deployed the 2d and 3d battalions in two lines of companj^ columns, the two rifle companies in front as skiraiishers, the 1st battalion in reserve; the two sotnias were on the i-iglit flank.
48 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
Three lines of rifle-trenches were taken by the regiment one after tlie other, and linally also tlic intreuchmeiits on the height of the subsequent Abdul Kerim Tabia; the assail- ants here captured a gun which had been dismounted by the fire of the Russian artillery.
Throw^n back to the! town, the Turks offered furious resistance from behind hedges and walls. The losses of the Kostroma Regiment increased from minute to minute; the regimental commander, three field officers, most of the other officers, and a large part of the men were dead or wounded. The ammunition of the infantry and the artillery, which had followed the assaulting infantry to within effective infantry fire, began to run short. For these reasons the regi- ment fell back at 9 a. m., when the Turks were bringing for- ward fresh reserves to the counter-attack. In order to ap- proach the main body, the retreat was made in a different di- rection from that of the attack, and the men's packs which had been taken ofl" before the assault, fell into the enemy's hands.
As the action began, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade moved from Tutchenitza to Radischevo.
Since the ground impeded the movements of the cavalry and as the mountain battery attached to the brigade could produce no effect on the hostile position, owing to its small caliber, the brigade moved more to the right to connect with the Kostroma Regiment. At 10 a. m., when the brigade reached Grivitza, the Kostroma Regiment was in retreat, in which the Cossack Brigade joined.
The Action at Plevna. 49
The Turkish pursuit did not extend beyond the original foremost Turkish positions.
3. Losses.
The 1st Brigade of the 5th Division lost 1 general, 51 field and company officers, and 1,878 men; it is to be noted here that in the assault on Xikopolis. a few days before, the Archangel Eegiment lost 12 men, the Wologda Regiment 6 officers and 256 men ; the loss of the brigade, whose effect- ive strength can hardly have been more than 5,000 men, therefore amounts to almost 2,000 men for the two days of the 15th and 20th of July.
On July 20th the Kostroma Regiment (which suffered no losses at Nikopolis) lost at Plevna 7 officers and 359 men killed, and 15 officers and 534 men wounded.
The losses of the Cossacks and of the artillery are not stated, but they can not have amounted to much.
The Turks claim to have captured a Russian gun on that day; nothing reliable is known about it; it may have been a gun of the 5th Battery of the 31st Brigade, since this battery accompanied the assaulting Kostroma Regiment to within range of infantry fire.
Comments. 1. That the supreme command attached so little im- portance to the reports which reached Tirnova on the 17th of July about hostile columns approaching the Vid from the west, and that it treated the occupation of Plevna as of in- ferior importance, are matters which can be commented on
50 Tactical Studies on the Battles AroKiid Plcrna.
only with a full knowledge of the idea entertained of the whole situation at that time. Why was not a strong body of cavalry, a division, or at least a. brigade, dispatched to Plevna in the middle of July during the struggle around Nikopolis? Being an important junction point of roads, 25 miles from Nikopolis and barely 43 from the point of pas- sage at i^istova, Plevna was well worth that much attention,
2. The advance of General Schilder-Schuldner's weak detachment in two widely separated columns against an enemy of unknown strength was imprudent; although, in view of the actual positions of the troops, a separation could not be avoided, an attempt should have been made to unite the two detachments before proceeding to the attack.
The march of the Nikopolis column under General Schilder-Schuldner, when considered by itself, invites un- favorable criticism. Instead of sending his Cossack Regi- ment forward at once to cover his march, the general led his infantry directly on Plevna, without caring for the where- abouts of his cavalry and without having given it specific instructional. On arri\'^l before the town on the afternoon of the 19th he had no cavalry to reconnoiter the ground in front or to establish communication with the other column; he was unable, on the one hand, to learn anything of matters in and around Plevna, and, on the other hand, he seems to have been uncertain of the whereabouts of the other detach- ments. The cannonade opened on Plevna appears to have been a cover behind which he hid his painful perplexity, but it had the good effect of informing the other detachments of the whereabouts of the main column.
The Action at Pier ua. 51
Some time after the beginning of the cannonade, the 9th Cossack Kegiment made its appearance; not only had it not preceded the infantry on the march to Plevna, but it had re- mained far in rear. On tlie night of July 18th-19th the bivouac of the Cossack Regiment at Riben was but 10 miles from Plevna, while the bivouac of the infantry on the same night was 22 miles from that place. By proper management the Cossacks would have had plenty of time to thoroughly reconnoiter the vicinity of Plevna before the arrival of the infantry; but at the moment when the infantry arrived and the artillery opened, the Cossacks were still quietly resting at Riben and in the act of cooldng. This can be explained in no other way except that the commander of the Cossack Regiment was not properly informed of the contemplated movement; and the fact that this infantry, marching at ran- dom toward the enemy, did not suffer a heavy defeat on the 19th, is probably due to the incredible clumsiness of the Turkish troops in offensive movements.
Turning to the march of the other column, we lind the infantry provided with two sotnias of Cossacks, which were properly employed in reconnaissance. However, the em- ployment of the Cossack Brigade, which was also attached to this column, can not be considered proper.
The brigade marched 25 miles, from P>ulgareni to Tut- chenitza, while the infantry column, which marched from Bulgareni to Zgalevitza, covered almost an equal distance. It is true that small patrols were sent out from Tiitchenitza, but complete infoi-mation Mt llie sit nation was not gained.
52 Tactical Sttidks on the Battles Around Plevna.
According to recent ideas on the employment of advanced bodies of cavalry in the Russian Army, one would expect the Cossack Brigade to move rapidly on Plevna, reach there about noon, make a feint against the town from the south under cooperation of the horse artillery, and endeavor to advance with several sotnias between the town and the river against the bridge over the Vid. Whether Plevna was occupied feebly or not at all, in any event sufficient informa- tion would have been gathered without exposing the brigade to great risk.
3. The attack of the two regiments of Archangel and Wologda.on the morning of July 20th was made without sufficient reconnaissance of the enemy's position and without any preparation by the fire of skirmishers ; the preparation of the attack by artillery did not last more than half an hour. From the very beginning five of the six available battalions were led to the attack against the wholly unknown position of the enemy; the only battalion kept in reserve was very soon called upon to detach two companies to the right to sn])port the Cossacks, so that there was no real reserve at the disposal of the leader for use in emergencies or after clearer knowledge of the situation.
The same may be stated, of tlie attack of the Kostroma Regiment; although one-third of the troops was nominally set aside as reserve, it was almost as soon engaged in the con- flict as the two other battalions.
4. The expenditure of ammunition in the six hours of this action seems to have been verv great, since almost all
The Action at Plevna. 53
the ammunition-carts were brought up and emptied. The Russian infantry carried 60 rounds in the pouches, and in addition each company was provided with a three-horse ammunition-cart. More than one-half of the ammunition- carts of the 1st Brigade fell into the hands of the Turks.
54 TacticKiI ^^tiidics on the Battles Around Flenia.
PART V.
THE BATTLE OF PLEVNA ON JULY 30TH.
1. Positio7i of' the troo]))< on the Evening of July Wth.
At Bryslan, 9tli Lancers, 9th Don Cossacks, 2d Don* Cos- sack Battery — 10 squadrons and 6 guns.
At Koioulovtsij, 81st lufantr}' Division (less the \Vov- onesh (124) Regiment and 1 battery at Sistova) — 9 battal- ions and 40 guns.
At Tristenik, 5tli Infantry Division (less Kostroma Regi- ment, No. 19, and 1 battery at Nikopolis) — 9 battalions and 40 guns.
At JCaragatch, 2d Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, with 3 batteries — 6 battalions and 24 guns.
A.i Poradiin, 1st Brigade of the 30th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade of the 32d Lifantry Division, 6 foot batteries, 1st Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, and 1 horse battery — 12 battalions, 8 squadrons, 54 guns.
At Bogot, the Caucasian Cossack Brigade with the Sth Don Cofesacks and the mountain horse battery — 12 sotnias • and 12 guns.
Total, 36 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 176 guns, among which were 80 nine-pounders, 72 four-pounders, 18 horse, and 0 mountain guns.
The line Brvslan — Poradim — Bogot was about 25 miles
The Batth of Plevixt. 55
long and formed an arc of a circle whose radius was about 12 miles and whose center w^as at Plevna. The left at Bogot was 12 miles from Lovtcha, w'hich was held by the Turks; the right at Brvslan was the same distance from Xii^opolis. The distance from the center of the position at Poradim to the Osma bridge in rear at Bulgareni was also 12 miles.
2. Dispositions for the Battle.
(a) Right flank cavalry detachment, under General Losh- kareff, to start at 0 a. m. from Brvslan, covered the right flank and observed as far as the Vid.
(&) Right King, under Lieutenant-Genera 1 Wilhelminoff (31st and oth Infantry Divisions), to attack the enemy's posi- tion north of the highroad — the 5th Infantry Division in reserve.
(c) Left u-ing. under Lieutenant-General Prince Shakof- skoi (1st Brigade of the 30th Division and 1st Brigade of the 32d Division), to march at 5 a. m, from Poradim and attack the position between Grivitza and Radischevo.
(d) Left flank cavalry detachment, under Major-General Skobeleff, to march at 5 a. m. from Bogot, take position on the Lovtcha road and watch the country, particularly in the direction of Lovtcha. Tlie detachment was reinforced from Prince Sha.kofskoi's command by the 3d Battalion of the Kursk Regiment, No. 125, and 4 guns.
Both cavalry detachments had orders, in case of the ene- my's retreat, to cross to the left bank of the Vid and bar the enemy's road to Sophia if possible.
(f) General reserre. under personal command of Lienten-
56 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Flevna.
ant-General Kriidener (2d Brio;ade of the 30th Infantry Di- vision, 2 squadrons each of the 11th Dragoons, and 11th Lancers, 1 horse battery ; total, 6 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 30 guns), was posted with the infantry at Poradim and the cavalry at Pelishat.
S. Deployment for Battle and the Artillery Combat up to 2:30 p. m.
The right icing completed its deployment by 7 a, m. The first line consisting of the 1st Brigade of the 31st Division with 6 battalions and 24 guns, in second line the Kosloff Regiment, No. 123, with 3 battalions and 16 guns.
About 10 o'clock the 5th Infantry Division, consisting of 9 battalions and 24 guns, was posted in third line.
At 8:15 a. m. the first gun was fired by the Turks; the 24 Russian guns in first line directed their fire on the flashes of the enemy's guns, the fog being so dense that the enemy's position could not be seen; all that could be observed in front was a wide ravine densely covered with brush and hos- tile skirmishers and 2 guns at its further edge.
By 9 a, m. the fog had settled so far that the large Grivitza redoubt became visible, against which the Russian guns, reinforced by the batteries in second line, now directed their fire. The ground did not permit of placing more than 40 guns in battery. The artillery combat thus opened was continued until 2:40 p. m.
The left wing occupied the village of Radischevo by 9 a. m. without firing a shot; the 1st Brigade (numbering 5 battalions and 28 guns after reinforcing Skobelefif) of the
The Battle of Plevna. 57
32d Division deployed on the heights to the east and north of the village; the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division was kept in reserve and posted at first on the road from Pelishat to Radischevo, subsequently nearer to Radisehevo.
At 10 a. m. the Turks opened the artillery combat, which was taken up by the Russians and continued until 2:30 p. m.; the infantry meanwhile not firing a shot. In the course of the cannonade two Turkish batteries ceased firing, the redoubt north of Radischevo (Hafiz Bey Tabia) had suffered severe!}', three Russian guns were rendered unserviceable and the battery had to be relieved from the reserve.
4- Attack of the Russian Right Wing.
At 2:40 p. m. Lieutena,nt-General Knidi^ner ordered Lieutenant-General Wilhelminoff to proceed to the attack of the Grivitza redoubt in two columns: one from the north and one from the east. The north column consisted of the Penza Regiment and 2d and 3d Battalions of the Kozloff Regiment; on the east General Wilhelminoff himself with the Tamboft" Regiment and 1st Battalion of the Kozloff Regi- ment; the right column was followed by a reserve of G bat- talions (Archangel and ^Yologda Regiments), the left by 3 battalions (Gfilitz Regiment).
The 1st Penza Battalion, which led the right column, took the first line of trenches on the near side of the ravine, but was brought to a halt by the murderous fire from a sec- ond line just behind it. The 2d Penza Battalion advajiced on the left of the first, carried the second liiu^ of ritlc- trenches. crossed the ravine with the retreating Turks, and
68 Tactical ^'<1ii(li('S on the Battles Around Plevna.
approached the redoubt. The third line of trenches in front of the redoubt was also taken, the assailants ensconced themselves in it, and a part of them rushed for the redoubt. After the commander of tlie 2d Battalion, who had placed himself at the head of the assailants, was killed on the para- pet, the attack was repulsed; the efforts of the rest of the regiment to take the redoubt were equally fruitless. After losing 29 officers and 1,000 men by the murderous infantry fire from the redoubt and flanking rifle-trenches, the Penza Eegiment retreated in considerable disorder.
The two Kozlofi" Battalions of this column then ad- vanced to the attack, penetrated to the redoubt, and a part reached the ditch, where the regimental commander fell pierced by three bullets. The assailants did not succeed in taking the breastwork, but maintained themselves in the ditch, both sides keeping up a murderous fire at short range.
At this time Lieutenant-General Schilder-Schuldner brought up from the right the last reserves of the column consisting of the Archangel and Wologda Regiments; he crossed the ravine and took the trenches on the side from whence up to this time the Kozloff Regiment had received flanking fire; but the attack of these six fresh battalions on the redoubt itself also failed.
The left column of four battalions under Lieutenant- General Wilhelminoff, which moved from the east and more in the direction of the highroad, came under such severe fire that the attack was stopped without reaching the redoubt.
The Bat lie of I'Irnia. £9
the men openiuo- what s<'emed to be a verv ineffective lapid fire.
The Galitz Re^dment, which formed the reserve of this column, havinoalso been bronjilit up, the attack was renewed and again repulsed.
At 6 p. m., after the infantry attack had lasted over three hours, the situation of the rig^ht wing was as follows: the three battalions of the Penza Regiment, almost destroyed by its losses, seem to have withdrawn from the fighting line altogether; the remnants of fifteen battalions, shot to pieces and badly intermixed, maintained themselves in the space between the redoubt and ravine, partly to the east, partly to the north of the former.
As early as 4 p. m. the whole Koloma Regiment had been drawn from the general resen^e to support the left wing. At 0 p. m. one battalion of the Serpuchoff Regiment, with some cavalry and artillery, was dispatclied to the extreme right to check the retrograde movement beginning there, leaving but two fresh battalions, two squadrons, and some artillery as general reserve.
Toward sundown Cxeneral Kriidener ordered a renewed attack, to support which he sent forward three companies of the reserve, followed subscMpiently by three more com- panies. Three successive assaults were repulsed; in* the last the commander of the 2d Brigade of the :i()th Division was wounded within 100 paces of the redoubt.
Darkness had meanwhile settled down, but in the vicin- ity of the redoubt a wild and disorderly conflict was con-
60 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Flevna.
tiiiued with uninterrupted firing and cheering. Under these circumstances, Kriidener abandoned all hope of a favorable turn of the struggle and gave the order to retreat. The last Serpuchoff Battalion of the reserve, the Galitz Regiment of the left column, which had suffered least, and the Woronesh Regiment, which had just arrived on the field from Sistova, were ordered to cover the retreat. These troops took up the action, under cover of w^hich the wounded were collected bj means of the available transportation.
The conflict raged around the redoubt during the whole night; at daybreak the last detachments retreated and it was not until 11 a, m. on July 31st that the troops of the right wing were assembled at Tristenik and Karagatch,
No pursuit took place.
5. The Attack of the Russian Left Winf/.
At 2:30 p. m. Prince Shakofskoi sent forward the Kursk and Rylsk Regiments (five battalions) on the two redoubts between the highroads to Lovtcha and Bulgareni. In front of the redoubts three and four lines of trenches had been constructed: The trenches were taken after a furious strug- gle and the Turks thix)wn back on the redoubts, whereupon the Rylsk Regiment moved on the eastern, the Kursk Regi- ment on the western redoubt. The eastern redoubt was car- ried after a brief struggle; two guns fell into the hands of the assailants, the Turks succeeding in removing ten other guns from the fortification in good time.
The assault on the western redoubt presented greater difficulties. On advancing against this redoubt the Kursk
The Battle of Flenia. 01
Regiment was taken in left fianlv by tlie fire of a battery and skirmishers in action on the edge of the Tutchenitza ravine, while in front on both sides of the redoubt dense lines of closed infantry appeared to receive the assailants with a murflerous fire at a range of 200 to 300 paces. To support the attack, some companies of the Rylsk Regiment advanced at this critical moment from the captured eastern^redoubt and the 1st Shuja Battalion from the reserve came up on the left, while the artillery of the left wing, reinforced by fresh batteries from the reserve, advanced at the same time. The attack was successful and the western redoubt was also taken, but the losses were very heavy. The commander of the Rylsk Regiment, although wounded, retained command of his regiment; the commander of the Shuja Regiment, leading his first battalion in person, fell mortally wounded, but ordered the soldiers, who wanted to carry him off, to leave him, and encouraged his men to advance. Matters had reached this stage at 5 p. m.
Prince Shakofskoi received from General Kriidener the information that the Koloma Regiment and a battery from the general reserve had been dispatched in support of the left wing. In fact, however, the regiment did not reach its destination, but became embroiled in the general conflict on the extreme right of the left wing without producing a visi- ble effect on the course of the action.
As the Turks were proceeding to the counter-attack with fresh forces, Shakofskoi, in the hope of using the Koloma Regiment as reserve, brought tlie 2d and 3d Shuja Battalions
62 Tact leal ><tudies on the Battles AioiiikJ PIciiki.
from his own reserve to the support of liis right, which left him but three fresh battalions of the Ja.roslof Regiment in reserve; two batteries were brought forward from tlie riglit of the artillery position and posted to the right of the east- ern redoubt. Soon afterward the 1st Jaroslof Battalioit was ordered forward to support the left.
Wi^i the beginning of darkness the Turks made a new counter-attack, this time with considerable bodies of cavalry on both flanks, endeavoring to turn the Russian position. To su])poi't the hard-pressed left, another Jaroslof battalion came forward from the reserve, while a battery advanced boldly into action almost on the flank of the Turkish attack and took it under efl'ective fire.
Shakofskoi decided to retreat, although the Turkish attack was repulsed; ten of his eleven battalions were in action and reduced by severe losses; all the troops were completeh^ exhausted and no reinforcements were at hand or in prospect to oppose the frequently renewed attacks of the Turks. The retreat was begun in good order, the two captured guns having to be left behind; the troops at first took up the position on the heights close in front of Rad- ischevo which they had in the morning, and passed the night there. Next morning they withdrew to Poradim unmolested.
6. Attach of the Left Flank Detachment.
Meanwhile General Skobeleff was making his last at- tack, presently to be described, thereby rendering the posi- tion of Shakofskoi's left less difficult.
Under cover of the dense fog, Skobeleff had moved from
The Battle of Phrna. (33
Bogot unmolested to Krishin, where he halted his main body and advanced in person with two sotnias and four guns to within 650 yards of the edge of the western suburb of Plevna. From this point he observed some 20,000 infantry in close reserve formation between the heights of the Grivitza re- doubt and the town, while cavahy was seen in rear toward the Vid.
At 10 a. m. ^^hakofskoi's guns were heard, and Skobeleff ordered his four guns to open fire, which was at once replied to by six Turkish guns. Shortly afterward quite a number of Turkish guns took up the fire, and infantrj^ columns with skirmishers in front and cavalry on the flanks moved to the attack of Skobeleff.
Before this overwhelming attack Skobeleff withdrew to his main position at Krishin and made the following dis- positions:
1. Colonel Tutolmin with three sotnias and twelve horse guns remained on the height of Krishin, fronting to- ward Lo'V'tcha witli, strong Cossack posts i)ushed out beyond.
2. One sotnia was sent to the left toward the Vid in observation, and twenty volunteers under an officer were charged with discovering a. ford for use in case the dctacli- ment should have to cross to the left bank to move on the en- emy's communications. The detachment of volunteers ac- complished its object to Skobelelf's complete satisfaction.
3. One sotnia was detached to the liglit, witli orders to keep up conimunicalion with Sliakofskoi. from wliose position Skobeleff was separated by ilic steep and nxky
64 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
Tutchenitza ravine; throughout the day it reported all that took place on Shakofskoi's side.
Skobeleff advanced with four remaining sotnias, the 3d Kursk Battalion, and the four foot guns toward Plevna to reoccupy the position he had held before and from which the Turks might direct an effective fire against the flank of Shakofskoi's troops.
Skobeleff at first moved to the attack with one and a half companies, two sotnias, and the four guns, keeping the rest of his detachment in reserve in case he should be at- tacked from the direction of Lovtcha. This small detach- ment occupied the commanding height close in front of Plevna and maintained itself there from 10 a. m. to 4 p. m. against eight Tuirkisih battalions supported by artillery, which made repeated attacks against the Eussian position. By 4 p. m, Skobeleff had become convinced that no danger was impending from Lovtcha; and he was informed that Shakofskoi was making a decisive attack. On receipt of this information he left but half a company in reserve and led three companies forward to support his hard-pressed detachment. When within a few paces of the guns the Turks were driven back as far as the edge of the town by a sudden bayonet charge.
■ Supported by the four guns, the Kursk Battalion with- stood for two hours thei repeated attacks of the Turks. It was only at dusk that Skobeleff ordered the retreat. To cover the withdrawal of the infantry and guns and the removal of the wounded, the Cossacks advanced repeatedly to the at-
The Batik of Plevna. 65
tack, mounted and dismounted. Upon the arrival of the de- tachment at Krishin at 10 p. m. SkobelefE received Shakof- skoi's order to withdraw to Bogot and Pelishat.
7. Losses. The Russian losses in killed, wounded, and missing are given as 169 officers and 7,136 men.
Some details of the official tables of losses are inter- esting.
The regiments of the 30th Divsion lost in killed and wounded :
Jaroslof, No. 117 2.38 men.
Shuja, No. 118 114 men.
Koloma, No. 119 85 men.
Serpuchoff, No. 120 214 men.
Details of the losses of the regiments of the 5th and 31st Divisions (IX. Corps) cannot be ascertained, since the losses at Nikopolis and in the two battles of Plevna are not separately given.
The losses of the two regiments of the XL Corps on the left of the first line, which captured the two redoubts north of Radischevo, were quite severe.
Kursk Regiment, No. 125 (part of tlie regi- ment was in action under Skobeleff). . . .
336 men killed.
Rylsk Regiment, No. 126. .725 men killed.
8. The Panic at Sistova. The following events, although very slightly connected
6(i Tactical Studies on the Battles A round Pleriin.
with the battle of Plevna, are here stated as forming an inter- esting contribution to the history of confusion created by a false alarm.
At noon on July 31st the first wounded from the battle- field of Plevna reached Sistova from Bulgareni, saving that the battle was lost and that it was rumored that a transport of wounded while en route had been attacked by Turkish cav- alry and cut down. The statement created consternation among the inhabitants of Sistova and among the men of new Bulgarian druschinas which were being formed there; a large portion of these men started for the pontoon bridge below the town with the cry, ''The Turks are coming!" Here a large number of empty provision-wagons were halting on the Bulgarian bank, their destination being Zimnitza, A drunken Cossack on an unsaddled horse, preceding the swarm of fugitives, galloped toward the bridge crying, "The Turks are in Sistova!'' whereupon a. terrible confusion ensued in the train, all the wagons trying to gain the bridge ; the swarm of fugitives from Sistova also rushed upon the bridge.
The commander of the bridge (General Eichter, of the Engineers), who happened to be on the north bank at the time, ordered the small detachments at his disposal to close the bridge by force of arms if necessary; through his ener- getic intervention he succeeded in restoring order; mean- while word came from the commander of Sistova that the report was false and that no Turks were in sight at all. To allay the uneasiness of the inhabitants the Kussian detach- ments stationed in the town had meanwhile taken a defen- sive position in front of the town.
The Battk of Plevna. 07
The bridge being closed, swarms of fugitives crossed tlie Danube by boat (in whicli operation several i)ersons were drowned); they soon spread tlie false alarm in Zimnitza: "The Turks have taken the bridge! The Turks are march- ing on Zimnitza ! The Turks are crossing from the right to the left bank on four steamers!"
The entire population and a large part of the wounded in the hospitals began to fly; after much trouble, Cossack patrols succeeded in bringing the fugitives back to town. The confusion was increased by the fact that at the time of the arrival of the first alarming news a detachment of Turks, captured in fonner engagements, happened to be conducted through Zimnitza..
Comments. 1. Greueral Kriidener, although nominally commander- in-chief, seems to have occupied himself chiefly with his own (IX.) corps, which formed the right wing, and to have left the conduct of the left wing without reservation to Prince Stiakofskoi, commander of the XI, Corps. This fact became evident in the dispositions made by Kriidener for tlu' ])()si- tion and attack of the IX. Corps (although that corps had an acting commander in th(» person of General AN'ilhelminof), wiiile he left these details on the other w'ing to General Shakofskoi. Moreover, Kriidener ordered the right wing (with which he remained exclusively) to attack at 2:40 p. m., after Shakofskoi had begun the attack of the left wing at 2:;>0 p. m. on lijs own responsibility. In uniform conduct
6 8 Tactical Studies on th e Battles Around Plevna .
of the baj;tle by a common superior, General Krudener is therefore out of the question.
2. A striking point in the disposition is the weakness of the general reserve consisting of one-sixth of the avail- able battalions. The disruption of the unity of the 30th In- fantry Division is also surprising; one of its brigades was combined with a brigade of another division to form the left wing, while the other brigade of the former division was held in reserve; the reason may have been a desire of plac- ing under Prince Shakofskoi's orders the only infantry bri- gade of his corps present (1st of the 32d Division).
The brigades and divisions being posted in lines in rear of each other instead of abreast caused a complete disrup- tion of the larger tactical units in the course of the battle. This was particularly noticeable in the IX. Corps, where it would have been far more appropriate to have fonned each of the great wing columns of an entire division.
3. General Kriidener is said to have reconnoitered the enemy's position in person on the day preceding the bat- tle; the same was done by Colonel Biskupski, chief of staff of the XI. Corps, in the portion south of the highroad Bul- gareni — Plevna, which was assigned to the left wing as its field of attack. Both reconnaissances seem to have been conducted in a very general way. For several days the Eussians had been in comparatively close proximity to the enemy, yet a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position does not seem to have taken place; sufficient information had not been gained about the details of the terrain in front,
The Battle of Plevna. 60
or about the fortifications of the Turks. Had this been done, the dense fog which covered the field during the first hours of the artillery combat, and which was not favorable to the eflB- cacy of the Russian artillery fire, might have been turned to good account by the Russians in maskingthe advance of strong skirmish lines against the Turkish position. It would have been possible, for instance, to capture the great ravine in front of the Grivitza redoubt without much difficulty and with comparatively small loss, thus securing from the be- ginning an intermediate position favorable to subsequent attack on the redoubt.
Skobeleff's bold and skillful mode of proceeding on the extreme left demonstrates that the fog could be taken advant- age of for reconnaissance and attack of the enemy's position.
4. Nowhere was the Russian attack ushered in hj the fire of skirmishers. After the cannonade, whose effect seems to have been small, the Russian infantry, which up to this time had not fired a shot, moved in dense masses to the at- tack, which was frontal throughout and unaccompanied by any attempt to turn the enemy's flank.
The chief strength of the Turkish position did not lie in the redoubts which have attracted the most attention, but in the tiers of rifle-trenches in front and flank of the redoubts. In order to capture a position entrenched in this manner it is evidently not so important to penetrate into the redoubts as to carry the trenches on the flanks, in which case the redoubt would be isolated and unable to hold out for any length of time.
70 Tactical IStndks on the Battles Around Plevna.
But the method of the right wing- in its attaclc is not based on sucli an idea. The nine battalions in the first line were formed in two columns and moved from north and east against the great redoubt in rear of the village of Grivitza; the entire second line was attached to these two columns from the beginning and moved off with them, so that, prop- erly speaking, all of the eighteen battalions of the right wing were out of hand of the leaders from the very begin- ning of the .attack.
If we examine the details of the action, we find the two columns advancing against the redoubt on a narrow front and under effective flank fire from some rifie-trenches at the side.
Of the right column, five battalions advanced succes- sively on the redoubt; each battalion reached the enemy when the preceding battalion had been used up; each bat- talion lost a large part of its men under the fire from the rifle-trenches which swept the approaches to the redoubt; of each battalion only fragments got into the ditch of the redoubt, where they maintained a hopeless and desperate struggle, in which a large part of the officers and the brav- est of the men found their death; further tactical availabil- ity of these five battalions was out of the question.
The six battalions of the Archangel and Wologda Regi- ments, brought up from the reserve to support the attack, at last turned on the rifle-trenches, the gauntlet of whose mur- derous fire the preceding assailants of tht* redoubt had run. These rifle-trenches were taken after a furious struggle, but
The Battle of Plevna. 71
now these six battalions were also expended, for it should be borne in mind that these battalions, whose strength at the beginning of July w^as probably less than 5,000 men, had lost more than 2,000 men and the greater part of their officers in the bloody actions of the loth and 20th of July. Attempts made by fractions of the battalions to take the redoubt failed and added to the losses, and henceforth these bat- talions were likewise no longer to be regarded as tactical bodies, but as a disorganized mass of more or less brave men on which the higher leaders could no longer exert any influence, since most of the officers were dead or wounded. The conditions with the left (east) column were similar. Here also the battalions of the second line became early in- volved in the action; all frontal attacks against the redoubt were repulsed with great loss, cliieflii hi/ the fire from the rifle- trenehes, which, on this part of the field, were not captured at all.
All available troops of the right wing (IS battalions) were expended and out of hand before the Turkish reserves moved to the counter-attack.
On the whole, the attack of the Russian left wing was conducted more correctly, and therefore with more success. The five battalions of the first line made their attack without preparation by fire, but simultaneously on a broad front, and supported by one battali<»n from the reserve and the Are of several batteries also advancing upon the enemy's posi- tion. The battalions of the first line succeeded in capturing both redoubfs au<l Wvo rifle-treiiclics in fi-itnt and (in 1 lie Hank,
7^ Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
wliilei five fresh battalions of the second line remained available.
The Turkish counter-attack, effectively supported by artillery and swarms of skirmishers in a flanking position along the Tutchenitza ravine, was repulsed with the aid of three battalions gradualh' brought forward from the sec- ond line.
At dusk the Turks began the second counter-attack with fresh forces; it was repulsed, it is true, with the as- sistance of another battalion from the second line, but having a single fresh battalion left to him, and having learned of the complete failure of the attack on the right, Shakofskoi did not wait for the third counter-attack of the Turks, and began a well-ordered retreat, covered by his last fresh battalion.
The course of the action was thus very different on the two wings; on the right Knidener's eighteen battalions failed to gain possession of the enemy's position, aud in this wing the Turks were not obliged to use their reserves at all (in consequence of which almost all of them were sent against Shakofskoi), and in order to cover the retreat of the bat- talions engaged, the last troops of the senselessly squan- dered general reserve had to be brought forward. On the left Shakofskoi's first line succeeded almost single-handed in capturing the enemy's position, and the second line was only usedto repulse two strong counter-attacks of theTurkish reserves; and at the termination of this furious and costly struggle the troops possessed a certain outward cohesion.
The Battk of Plcvmt. 73
which rendered tactical action and leading; possible. It can not be denied that the left wing accomplished much more with far inferior means than the right.
In casting a parting glance at the employment of the "general reserve," we find that shortly after the beginning of the infantry attack it was diverted from its proper pur- pose by direct orders of General Kriidener and distributed among both wings as a kind of special reserve. At 4 p. m. the Koloma Regiment was detached to the left wing (where it became engaged in the general action without plan or effec^t), and the Superchoff Regiment was retained in sui)port of the right wing. From the moment of this division the all- too-w^eak reserve was no longer able to exert a decisive influ- ence on the general conflict; how the Superchoff Regiment was subsequently squandered has been stated above.
Had the right wing gained the same results as the left, compelling the Turks to expend part of their reserves against it, then a general advance about dusk by tlu* reserve, held in hand until the moment, either in the center along the great highroad or on either flank, might, and probably would, have produced a decisive result of this bloody day in favor of the Russian arms.
5. It becomes evident from the above descrijttion that we can hardly speak of a cooperation of the three arms in the course of the battle. The preparation of the attack was left exclusively to the artillery; the attack of the infantry re- ceived little assistance from the ai-tillcrv on the left, and none
74 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
at all on the right; the Kussian cavalry' took no active part in the conflict of the main bodies.
The possihilitfj of cooperation of the three arms in un- favorable terrain is demonstrated by the small left flank de- tachment under General Skobeleff.
The conduct of the action by this general shows a rare combinaton of prudence and rashness. His personal and thorough reconnaissance of the ground; his careful arrange- ments for guarding the rear of his detachment, and for main- taining communication with the main army; the bold ad- vance of his small detachment close to the enemj'^s position, attracting disproportionately large forces of the enemy and rendering the attack of the main army correspondingly easier; his stout defensive action, in which infantry, artil- lery, and cavalry (both mounted and dismounted) sup- ported one another with great skill ; lastly, upon learning of the beginning of the main attack on the part of Shakof- skoi's troops, his energetic offensive, for which he em- ployed his heretofore carefully husbanded small infantry reserve, and the skillful and successful retreat under diffi- cult circumstances — are certainly worthy of great consid- eration and thorough study.
Battle of Zgahritza <ind PcU.shat. 75
PART VI.
SORTIE BATTLE OF ZOA'LEVITZA AXL) PELISHAT ON THE 31ST OF AUGUST.
1. Position of the West Artnij on the Morninf/ of the Slst of August.
The right of the aruiy was formed by the 4th Roumanian DiYision, which was posted between the Vid and the highroad to Nitopolis ; the IX. Corps formed the center between the Nikopolis and Bulgareui roads; the IV. Corps formed the left between the Bulgai*eni and Lovtcha roads.
The IV. Corps was commanded by General Kryloff , in the absence of General Zotoflf, who was acting as commander-in- chief of the West Army. The following positions were occu- pied on the morning of the 31st of August:
The outposts stood on the line Bogot — Tutchenitza — Radischevo — GrivitzadO miles) and were furnished on the left by 2 squadrons of the 4th Lancers, on the right by 2 si^uad- rons of the 4th Hussars.
The corps was posted as follows: On the left at Vv\- ishat, the regiments Susdal,No. 02,Uglitz,No. 63,2 squadrons of the 4th I>ancei*s, and probably 4 batteries. Alxuit 2.0(io yards in fr(mt of the jjosition there was a lunette, (»<•( iijticd by 2 companies and 2 guns.
At Zgalevitza on the riffht tliere were entrenched 2
70 Tacticdl Studies on Ihv Baltics A yoiiiid Plevna.
Shuja battalions, 2 squadrons of the 4th Hussars, 2 foot batteries, 8th Horse Battery of the IV. Corps, the Galitz Regiment, No. 20, with a battery of the IX, Corps; also a sap- per company.
The regiments Jaroslof, No. 117, Koloma, No. 119, Ser- puchoff. No. 120, and 2 batteries were in reserve.
The following troops of the IV. Corps were absent:
The 4th Dragoons observed the valley of the Osma at Karahassan;
The A'ladimir Regiment, No. 61, was on the way from Zimnitza to join its corps and had reached Karagatch (8 miles west of Bulgareni on the great road) ;
The Kazan Regiment, No. 64, '1 Shuja battalion, No. 118, and a battery were with the corps of Prince Imeretinski operating against Lovtcha;
The position of the 4th Cossack Regiment and 3 bat- teries at this time cannot be ascertained.
2. Turkish Attack, 6:30 a. m. until 1 p. m.
At 6:30 a. m. the Russian outposts reported that strong Turkish bodies were marching out of the entrenchments south of the highroad and advancing onPelishataud Zgalev- itza with a thick line of cavalry in front.
General Zotoff was at first inclined to consider the re- ported movement a feint to screen a serious attack against either the IX. Corps or the Roumanians. No changes in the position of the troops were made for the present.
The 2 squadrons of Lancers at Pelishat, the 2 Hussar squadrons, and the horse battery at Zgalevitza advanced to
Battle of Zfjalevitza and Pdlsluit. 77
the support of the haid-pressed outposts. In view of the strength of the Turkish cavalry, which numbered 2,500 horses, the Lancers gradually fell back on Pelishat, and the Hussar Regiment on Zgalevitza,
At 8 a. m. the Turkish cavalry withdrew to the flank, disclosing a strong line of infantry, w'hich moved to the attack on Pelishat, The lunette was taken after a brief but fierce struggle; its garrison fell back on Pelishat, where it was relieved by 5 companies of the Susdal Regiment. Af- ter 3 batteries had cannonaded the Turks for some time, de- tachments of the Susdal Regiment advanced to the attack and recaptured the lunette.
Tow^ard 9 a. m. the Turks brought up considerable re- inforcements; their right extended more and more and turned the left of the Russian position; swarms of Bashi- bozouks* penetrated into Pelishat and set fire to the village. A new attack on the lunette was repulsed; opposite the position of Zgalevitza batteries came into action and a can- nonade began on both sides.
At 10 a, m., no reports of any hostile movements having been received from the outposts of the IX. Corps and the Roumanian Division, General Zotoff became convinced that the main attack was against his left wing I'lV. Corpsi. and issued the following orders:
(o) One brigade of the IX. Corps to advance at once on the highroad and attack the enemy's left flank.
(&) The reserves of the IX. Corps — 3 regiments of the 30th Infantry Division — to take position north of I'oradim
.*Guerinas or irreg-iilar troops.— A. L. W.
78 Tact'icaJ studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
and hold tlieiuselves at the disposal of the commauder-iu- chief.
(c) The Vladimir Reji^imeiit, Xo. 01, which had reached Karagatch, to leave train and knapsacks and to march as quickly as possible to Poradim to join the general reserve.
(d) The 4th Roumanian Division to assemble at once at ( 'alysovat.
Opposite the entire Russian position from Pelishat to Zgalevitza the Turks deployed a long line of infantry about noon; in front of the infantry some 40 or 50 guns fired on the Russian position aud were replied to by the Russian batteries.
3. Repulse of the Turkish Attack, 1 to 5 p. m.
Toward 1 p. m. the Turkish infantry advanced to a gen- eral attack, which was made in three principal directions: against the position of the lunette, against the left flank, and against the center of the Zgalevitza position,
(a) The attack against Pelishat and the lunette in front was repulsed in front by the fire of 4 batteries; the com- mander of the IV. Corps, General Krylotf, advanced against the extreme right of the assailing Turks with 4 squadrons of Lancers, 2 squadrons of Hussars, and a horse battery. The Turks retired slowly and threw their right well back when it was threatened by the Russian cavalry.
(6) The attack on the left of the Zgalevitza position struck 1 Galitz battalion, No. 20, and 4 guns. This portion of the position was reinforced from the reserve at Poradim by
Battle of Zf/alcvifza and PrJishttt. 79
2 battalions (Serpiu-lioff.Xo. 120) aud a battery. The attack of the Turks was repulsed.
(c) The attack directed a gainst the center of theZgalev- itza position was carried out witli <ireat energy and reached the Russian rifle-trenches, but was repulsed by the counter- attack of the Russian infantry posted there — 2 Galitz bat- talions. No. 20, and 2 Shuja. battalions. No. 118; 24 guns cov- ered the Turks with a murderous fire during their advance as well as during their retreat.
During the great infantry attack the cavalry of the Tui'kish left attempted to tuni the right of the Zgalevitza position; the movement was discovered by the 2 Hussar squadrons posted ther(% and frustrated without difficulty by artillery fire.
Notwithstanding their previous failure and great loss, the Turks undertook a second attack at ;i ]). m., well pre- pared by artillery and infantry fire. The attack was not made with the same energy- as the first, and failed also.
On this occasion the regiments Susdal and TTglitz of the left, and 2 battalions each of the regiments Galitz and Shuja of the right wing, made an attempt to take the offensive, but were checked by a Turkish counter-attack undertaken l»artly by fresh troops and su])ported by severe fire of heavy artillery. whereu]»on the Russian battalions fell back to their original positions. At 4:30 p. m. the Turks began their re- treat to IMevna. under the cover of a heavy artillery fire.
Jj. Ineffectual l'iti:siiit. freneral KrvlDft' ordered the ten battalions in first line
80 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
and the available 8 squadrons of Lancers and Hussars to pursue, which, however, yielded no result.
The 2 cavalry regiments had been on outpost without interruption for two months; and they had not been able either to feed or unsaddle throughout this day. The Dra- goon regiment posted on the Osma did not reach the corps until after the termination of the action.
The infantry pursued for three miles and returned with- out having effected an;\i:hing particular. The result might have been better if the brigade which was ordered forward to Grivitza by the highroad had been able to take the Turks in flank. Although directed to advance with the utmost speed in the direction indicated, the brigade did not leave its knapsacks behind, but started with them; this circumstance, in connection with the great heat, so delayed the movement that the brigade was too late to act against the enemy's flank.
5. Losses. The losses of the Russians were:
Killed 3 officers, 171 men;
Wounded 27 officers, 708 men;
Missing 66 men;
Total 30 officers, 915 men.
Comments. 1. The outer line of the Russian line of investment, or, better, their line of observation east of Plevna, began on the left at the road to Lovtoha and described from there an arc
Battle of Zf/alcvitza and Pelishat. 81
of a circle, with Plevna as a center, to the Vid above Riben. The line had an extent of about 20 miles with a radius of 'about G miles. The position of the Russian reserves at Pora- dini was 12 miles to the east of Plevna and G miles in rear of the center of the Russian front.
It may not be out of place here to cast a glance at the strength of the armies opi)asing each other at IMevna.
At the beginning- of August the ''West Arm^^" in front of Plevna consisted of the 4 infantry divisions of the IV. and IX. Corps, Avhich, at the time of the passage of the Dan- ube, may have numbered about 40,000 effectives. Deduct- ing 10,000 men for the losses suffered by these divisions in the' actions of July, there remain 30,000 infantry, without counting loss from disease. To these may be added about 10,000 cavalry, artillery, and special troops, and as many Roumanians (4th Division), giving a total of some 50,000 men. Deducting losses from disease during the months of July and August, and taking also into account the absence of several bodies included in the above calculation which were attached to the cori)S operating against Lovtcha, the maximum available strength did not probably exceed 45,000 men present before Plevna toward the end of August.
In calculating the strengtli of tlic Tuikisli Aiiiiy it is perhaps best to figure backward from the number of men com])ris<'d in the suncndci-. At 1liat lime IIkm-c were in PleTua some 57,000 men, inclusive of 20,000 sick and wounded; it oan be proved that reinforcements to the amount of gome 12,000 men entered Plevna during the month
82 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
of September, which leaves 45,000 men. Estimating the htss from battle or disease from September to December at 5,000 men (probably much too low), we find that toward the end of August the Turkish army at Plevna numbered at least 50,000 effectives, and was at least equal, and probably supe- rior, to the investing army, which, moreover, was scattered over a line 20 miles long.
2. The failure of the pursuit after the repulse of the Turkish attack renders it proper to ask whether such an at- tempt was right under the circumstances.
It would probably be so only in case it were the in- tention to enter the entrenchments of the retreating ene- my, or in case it seemed practicable to drive a portion of the enemy from the line of retreat before reaching the shelter of the entrenchments. If neither is the case, pursuit under similar circumstances had better be omitted, as it will in- variably result in the retreat of the pursuing troops from the works, thus raising the moral of the previously defeated enemy.
Capture of Lovtcha. 83
PART VII.
CAPTURE OF LOVTCHA OX THE 3D OF SEPTEMBER.
■ 1. Advance on Lovtcha.
Early in August General Skobeleff was posted at Kak- rina, on the road from Selvi to Lovtcha, with the Caucasian Cossack Brigade and a mixed detachment from the IV. Corps (Kazan Regiment, No. 64, 1 Shuja battalion, and 1 bat- tery). A portion of the new reinforcements had by this time reached Selvi, consisting of the 2d Infantry Division, the 2d ]5rigade of the 3d Infantry Division with its artillery, the 3d Rifle Brigade, and a heavy battery made up of 4 guns cap- tured at Nikopolis.
On the 31st of August Prince Imeretinski, commander- in-chief of the forces at Selvi, received orders to .attack Lovtcha.
On the 1st of September Skobeleff was accordingly I)ushed forward from Kakrina to Fontana (about 3,000 j'ards east of Lovtcha), with orders to occup}- the heights dominat- ing the approaches to the position of Lovtcha, to recon- noiter the terrain with a view to artillery positions, and to construct rifle-trenches and gun-emplacements.
The Caucasian Cossack Brigade was to cross the Osma at Iglaw (7 miles below Lovtcha) and to reconnoiter the road to Plevna (by which reinforcements might reach Lovtcha
84 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
or by which its garrison might withdraw) ; 2 sotnias of the 30th Don Cossacks were to observe the roads from Trojan to Selvi. A single poor road was available for the march of the main body from Selvi to Lovtcha (33 miles), so that it was started in echelons^-the 2d Brigade of the 2d Division on the afternoon of September 1st, the 2d Brigade of the 3d Division at 11 p. m., the 1st Brigade of the 2d Division at 2 o'clock next morning, and at 4 a. m. (September 2d) the 3d Kifle Brigade.
Z. Preparatory Arrangements on the 1st and 2d of Scptcinher.
General Skobeleff reached Fontana at 2 p. m. September 1st, recounoitered the country, and ordered the 1st Kazan Battalion to occupy the height (a) on the left of the road and the remaining troops of his detachment to take post in rear of that height.
Throughout the night the men were at work construct- ing rifle-trenches and emplacements for 21 guns, and 1 bat- tery was dragged by the infantry to the steep, rocky height (6) north of the road, where it opened fire at 5 a. m. September 2d, sweeping more particularly the ground iu front of the height (a).
During the uight of the 2d-3d the infantry dragged 5 batteries to the height (h), so that on both sides of the road 48 guns were iu position.
Major-Greneral Dobrovolski, w^ho was to form the right wing of the position with the 3d Rifle Brigade, arrived at Prissiaka (3 miles northeast of Lovtcha) on the evening of
Capture of Lovtcha. 85
September 2d, and entrenched himself on the height in front during- the night and the following morning; a field battery and the heavy battery heretofore mentioned were placed in position at this point early on the morning of Septem- ber 3d.
For the execution of the general attack contemplated for the 3d, Prince Imeretinski directed tliat, after proper preparation by artillery fire, the left wing under Skobeleff attack the **Red Hill," situated close to Lovtcha and forming the key to the enemy's position; that Dobrovolski, with the right wing, attack the heights on the right bank of the Os- ma. The 2d Infantry Division and the parts of the 3d Di- vision present were to follow in reserve.
3. Action on the Right Bank of the Osma.
At 5:30 a, m. September 3d the artillery opened along the whole Russian linc^^ — with IG four-pounders, 40 nine- pounders, and the 4 heavy guns. On the left the fire was continued without inteuruption until 2 p. m. According to Russian accounts, the Turkish artillery, thenumber of whose guns cannot be ascertained, but which certainly was much inferior to the Russian, offered a most obstinate and suc- cessful resistance.
At 6:15 a. m. the Turks opened a brisk infantry fire from the trenches on the heights of the right bank of the Osma against Dobrovolski's rifle battalions in front of Prissiaka, The latter must have been in a faulty jtosition — no other ex- planation-can be given of the loss of 8 officers and 150 men
8 6 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
iu the 11th Rifle Battalion before the Russian infantry in this wing had fired a shot.
According to the plan, Dobrovolski ^Yas not to advance until Skobeleff's attack on the "Red Hill" had succeeded. In view of the great losses which his troops had suffered, and which seemed likely to increase with further delay, General Dobrovolski at 8 a. m. moved against the opposite heights on the right bank, which were defended by two lines of rifle- trenches — one half way up, the other at the crest. The rifle brigade (reinforced by a combined company of the head- quarters guard of the commander-in-chief) captured the heights after an action lasting from 8 to 11 a. m. ; the Turkish left wing fell back behind the Osma. The Reval Regiment was brought forward from the reserve to support General Dobrovolski; it turned to the left, where meanwhile the at- tack on the "Red Hill," the chief point of the hostile posi- tion, had been preparing.
After the great Russian battery on both sides of the road had continued its fire against the Turkish position un- til 2 p. m., the Kazan Regiment advanced, with band playing, to the attack on the "Red Hill," and captured it. Two bat- teries from the reserve were at once dragged to the top of the hill, whence they opened fire against the line of redoubts on the left bank of the Osma, whose central stronghold was a formidable redoubt. On the right of the Kazan Regiment, north of the road, the regiments of Kaluga and Libau crossed the marshy bottom intervening between the Russian aiid Turkish positions, and captured the heights north of the
Capture of Lovtcha. 87
"Red Hill," leaving the whole right bank iu j^he hands of the Russians.
4. Action on the Left Bank of tlie Osma.
Upon the capture of the "Red Hill" the 1st Kazan Bat- talion took post there, while the remaining 2 battalions of the regiment crossed the river, penetrated into the town, and captured its farther ed^e after a brief action.
In addition to the 2 batteries posted on the "Red Hill" itself, 2 more were posted on the highroad farther to the north, so that 32 guns brought their fire to bear on the en- trenchments of the left bank. The regiments Pokof, No 11, Estland, No. 8, Reval, No. 7, and the 1st Shuja Battalion crossed the river, so that, inclusive of the 2 Kazan battalions already there, 12 battalions stood in readiness for attack.
Eight battalions of these troops advanced at 5:30 p. m. against the right of the enemy's position, while the Kaluga Regiment, No. 5, together with detachments of the Libau Regiment, No. (5, and the Rifles, crossed the river lower down and attacked the left of the Turkish position. The latter was taken after a furious hand-to-hand conflict; the retreating Turks were pursued by the Caucasian Cossack Brigade, which advanced from the right wing across the Osma. Two Turkish battalions were cut off and destroyed by the Cossacks after brave resistance; the fire of the Cos- sack horse battery which had accompanied ihc Cossacks made great havoc among tlie fleeing Turks.
88 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
5. Losses.
The losses of the Kussians were:*
Killed G officers, 313 men.
Missing 52 men.
Wounded 33 officers, 1,112 men.
Total 39 officers, 1,477 men.
On the part of the Turks neither the number of troops engaged nor the losses can be ascertained. According to Russian accounts, 2,200 Turks were buried within the cap- tured entrenchments, not counting those killed by the Cos- sacks during the pursuit. It seems verv probable, under the circumstances described, that the latter number was very great. The statement of Prince Imeretinski at the conclusion of his report, that 3,000 Turks (the number occurs more than once, and is therefore not a misprint) were cut down in their flight, bears too much the stamp of inordinate exaggeration to be of any value whatever, the more when it is considered that the pursuing Cossacks could barely have numbered more than 1,000 horses.
6. Events on the J/th and 5th of September.
Late on the evening of September 3d reports were re- ceived from the headquarters of the IV. Corps that strong bodies of the enemy had marched froni Plevna in the direc- tion of Lovtcha; soon afterward patrols reported the appear- ance of strong hostile detachments.
On the morning of September 1th this column moved on the position of Lovtcha, and tried to gain the Russian left
Capture of Lovtcha. 89
flank by continued maneuvering to the right. The conflict, however, was limited to a wholly ineffective artillery com- bat, and toward noon the Turks withdrew in the direction of Mikren (12 miles southwest of Lovtcha).
On the 5th of September Prince Imeretinski left the 2d Brigade of the 3d Division at Lovtcha and marched to rejoin the main body of the West Army, whose left wing he reached in the evening at Bogot (about 12 miles).
Comments.
1. A surprising feature of the order of march of the corps from Selvi to Lovtcha is, that the Rifle Brigade, al- though intended to form the right of the attack, marched at tJie rear of the column, and that the troops intended for reserves marched in front. It is also surprising that the unity of the 2d Division was broken up on the march by sandwiching a brigade of the 3d Division between the two brigades of the 2d.
2. As the corps had 70 guns, there must have been present a number of field officers of artillery and certainly one (probably two) brigade commanders; yet it was not an artillery offlcer, but Captain Kiiiopatkin* of the general staff', who was charged with ])osting the artillery on the heights on both sides of the highroad.
The same Captain Kuropatkin traced the lines for the rifle-trenches to be constructed on the left, and the execu-
"In view of the fact that Kuropatkin. though only a captain, was Skobeleff'.s chief of staff", the author's conun<=nts seem somewhat severe. Kuropatkin after- wards became a lieutenant-Kt*neral and Governor of the Trans-Caspian Provinces. He is a soldier of distinsruished ability, and is regarded by many as SkobeleflTs nat- ural successor. — A. L. W.
90 Tacticnl FitudleH on the Battles Around Plevna.
tion of these pioneer works, including the construction of , emplacements for 4S ^uns, was directed by an infantry lieu- tenant of tlfe Kazan regiment. On the right of General Dobrovolski's position the construction of rifle-trenches and gun-emplacements was superintended by an ensign of the sapper battalion of the Guard, who, with his small detach- ment of sappers, belonged to the combined Guard company w^hich formed the commander-in-chief's headquarter guard. This corps, therefore, although consisting of 26 battalions, seems to have been practically without special troops.
3. The attack on the Turkish position of Lovtcha was purely frontal, and its preparation and inception was left to the artillery, which, to be sure, was very much superior to that of the enemy. Not a musket seems to have been dis- charged on the Kussian left, before the infantry advanced to the decisive attack on the ''Red Hill," in doing which it had to traverse a distance of not less than 1,000 yards from its sheltered position to that of the enemy.
4. It would appear from our description that the un- suitable position of the rifle brigade on the right made it almost helpless against the enemy's infantry entrenched on the right bank of the Osma. Instead of opposing the trou- blesome and destructive infantry fire of the Turks with musketry, the Russian right wing was unable to help itself except by an attack, which was contrary to the programme and insufiSoiently prepared, but which succeeded through the bravery of the troops and their superior numbers.
5. The vigorous advanctv of the Cossack Brisrade
Capture of Loutcha. 'Jl
against the defeated enemy's line of retreat resulted in con- siderable loss for the latter. The question seems not inap- propriate here, whether, in view of the great and undoubted numerical superiority o'f the Russians in this action, a turn- ing movement below the position by a strong infantry de- tachment, say a brigade, might not have been decisive and entailed less loss? It appears from the description tliat the Osma could be crossed with little trouble and witliont using the bridge.
6. The headquarters of the IV. Corjjs, which formed the left of the Russian army before Plevna, discovered in the course of the afternoon that a strong Turkish column was marching from Plevna against Lovtcha, where it was known that Prince Imeretinski was engaged in battle. A report was accordingly sent to him. It does not appear, however, that the IV. Corps made any movement of troops in indirect support of the corps engaged at Lovtcha. An advance of the cavalry and horse artillery posted on the Russian left against the flank of the hostile column would ceitainly have seriously delayed or stoj^ped that movement.
7. The constant maneuvering to the right by the Turk- ish column which appeared before Lovtcha on the morning of September itii is explained by the Russians as an attempt, threatened but not c<arried out, of turning their loft. The movement is, however, susceptible of a difl'erent oxpliniation. The Turkish coIuhui from Plevna iwliosc approximate strength is not known) reached the vicinity of Lovtcha at a time when the garrison of that place was in full flight, proba-
92 Tactical Sfxdic.^ on the Jiattles Around Plevna.
bly toward Mikren, in the oj posite direciion, on account of the turning movement of The Cossacks in the north. Under the circumstances, it is not improbable that the Turkish col- umn had good reason to consider the direct road to Plevna, leading as it would i»ast the left of the Russian main posi- tion, too dangerous for its retreat, and therefore executed a sort of liank march past the Kussian position under the cover of a rather harmless cannonade, with a view of gaining the road to the upper Vid by way of Mikren. Nor should it be overlooked that the movement was best calculated to cover the road to the Tetewen and Jablonitza passes, which were now endangered by the capture of Lovtcha by the Russians
Artillery Attack on Plevna. 93
PART VIII.
ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PLEVNA FROM SEPTEM- BER 7TH TO IITH.
1. Dispositions for the Night of September 6th-lth. At 0 p. in. (ju the <»tli the troops left their eucanipineuts and took up the followin*^- position aj;ainst the south front of the Turkish entrenchments:
(a) General Kriidener with the IX. Corps between the Bulgareni and the I'elishat roads, where emplacements were constructed for the artillerj- and trenches for the infantry. Three infantry regiments and the 6 batteries were placed in first line; 8 infantry regiments with 4 batteries formed the corps reserve; 1 regiment and 1 battery formed part of the main reserve; 1 regiment with 1 battery was at Nikopolis.
In addition 20 siege guns in 2 batteries were established in the front line of the corps.
(b) General Kryloff with the I\'. Corps was on the left of the IX. on the so-called "heights of Radischevo," and here also emplacements and trenches were constructed. The corps had 3 regiments of the 16th Division and 5 batteries in first line; the 1st Brigade of the 3()th Division with 1 bat- teries formed the corps reserve; the 2d Brigade of the oOth Division with 2 batteries w'ere assigned to the main reserve; 1 regiment (Kazan) and 1 battery were as yet with Prince Imeretinski.
V»4 Tnctlval titudies on the Battles Around Plevna.
{(■) GeiuMiil IMiiicp TiiicicJiiiski with his detachment of the 2d Infaiili'v Division and its aitilleiy, the :>d Rifle Bri- gade, a batteries of the 8d Artillery Brigade, and 4 siege guns was posted at Tutchenitza, in rear of the left of the IV. Corps. The detachments from the IV. Corps rejoined their own corps.
(fZ) The 4th Koumanian Division was posted north of the highroad, abreast of the IX. Corps. Three regiments of irregular Roumanian cavalry guarded the space between the right of the division and the Vid.
(c) General Loshkareff with the 8th and 9th Dragoons, the 9th Lancers, and the 9tk Cossacks with 2 horse batteries was posted on the highroad in rear of the Roumanians and the IX. Corps.
(f) General Leontieff with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalr}' Division and a horse battery covered the left of the IV. Corps and maintained communication with the 2 Cossack brigades of the Don and Caucasus which were observing the Lovtcha road.
{g) The general reserve consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division, the Galitz Regiment, No. 20, of the 5th Di- vision, 8 batteries, the Hussar regiments Mariopul, Xo. 4, and Kieff, Xo. 9, and a horse battery. It w'as posted west of Pelishat at the junction of the Grivitza — Tutchenitza and Pelishat — Plevna roads.
(/«) Three sotnias of the 84th Don Cossacks formed the headquarters guard of the commander of the West Army, who took jiost with the main reserve.
Artillenj Attack mi Plevna. 95
{%) Packs were left bebiud in the camps; each man car- ried two pounds of coolced meat and four pounds of hard bread. Each regiment formed a detachment of convales- cents to guard the packs and train.
(/.) The light baggage followed the troops. The flying park of the IX. Corps at Zgalevitza, of the IV. Corps between Tutchenitza and Bogot. Reserve park of the IX. Corps at Bulgareni, of the IV. Coi^is at Leshan. Baggage of the IX. Corps in rear of Karagatch, of the IV. Corps in rear of Poradim.
(Z) The dressing station of the IX. Cor])s at the "Three Wells," 2 miles in rear of the IV. Corps on the Tutchen itza brook. As many country carts as possible were col- lected at the dressing stations. 2. Erection of Batteries duriiKi the Night of Septemher 6th-7th.
Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, the whole movement was carried out with rapidity, order, and silence, the leaders having previously familiarized themselves with the positions to be taken and roads to be followed. The troops carried gabions, fascines, and entrenching tools, and constructed emplacements for field and siege guns 2,000 to 2,500 yards from the enemy's works.
One company of the .''>d Sapper Battalion was assigned to each corps, a,nd a detachment of 40 sapi»ers to the Rou- manian Division; 2 sapper comi)anies were charged with the establishment of the siege artillery — one for 12, the other for S twenty-four-p(»und(M-s. Four infantry l)atlali<»ns furnished the working parties and 4 other infantry battalions brought up gabions, fascines, and other material.
96 Tactical Studies on the Battles A round Plevna.
The entrenching tools had been issued to the troops from the field engineer park.
The earthworks were completed b}' G a. m. and armed with the nine-pounder field batteries and the 20 siege guns. In each of the 2 great batteries an observatory 95 feet high was constructed of ladders.
3. The 7th of September.
At G a. m. the battery of 12 siege guns fired a salvo as a signal, whereupon all the batteries — numbering altogether 20 twenty-four-pounders and 88 nine-pounders — opened fire, which W'as briskly answered by the Turks.
The Russian infantry lines, posted under cover, were in complete readiness for battle. Wherever water was near, the infantry cooked a meal at noon.
The cannonade was continued throughout the day.
4. Dispositions for September 8th.
In the course of the night the artillery was moved closer to the enemy's works and brought into action some four- poimder batteries, which heretofore had not taken part on account of the long range.
The 3d Roumanian Division crossed the Vid at Riben at daybreak, closed up on the right of the 4th Division, and brought its artillery into action.
The Roumanian Reserve Division moved to Yerbitza and formed the special reserve of the Roumanians.
General Loshkareff with his 4 Russian cavalry regi- ments, reinforced by 4 Roumanian cavalry regiments.
Artillcri/ AtfacJ: on Ph iitu. 97
crossed to the left bank of the Vid at Ribeii aud moved to Lower Dubnik on the Sophia road; his task was to cut the enemy's communications and to fall upon him in case of his retreat from Plevna.
General Prince Imeretinski moved during the night from Tutchenitza to the Lovtcha road to gain the wooded ridge south of Plevna. 5. The Artillenj Combat on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of Septemher.
The dispositions for the 8th of September were carried out with precision; the batteries were advanced during the night to within 1,G00 yards of the enemy's works; in addi- tion to those previously engaged, 5 Russian and 5 Rou- manian batteries took part; the fire was chiefly directed against the Grivitza redoubt and the Radischevo redoubt. At first the Turks answered briskly, but toward 2 p. m. their fire diminished, and ceased toward evening altogether.
In order to disturb the Turks in repairing their works, the Russian artillery maintained a slow fire throughout the night.
Eight of the siege guns which on the 8th had confined their fire to the Grivitza redoubt, were shifted, during the night to the position of the IV. Corps to bring their fire to bear on the middle group of redoubts.
The cannonade was maintained along the whole front on the 9th. The artillery conflict of the past few days had cost the Russians about HOO men.
On the 10th of September the bombardment of the Turk- ish position was at first continued as heretofore, but it soon
1)8 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
became evident that it could not continue niucli longer for lack of ammunition. Prompt replenishment could not be hoped for, as the fine weather suddenly changed on the even- ing of the 10th, and the ensuing rain quickly rendered all roads impracticable.
The uninterrujited fire of several days had also damaged several carriages of the siege guns and quite a number of those of the field guns.
Under these circumstances it seemed unwise to continue the artillery combat, and the assault, which was to be pre- pared by the cannonade, had to be abandoned or made at once. The latter alternative was decided upon.
6. Preparatori/ Actions of the Left Wing on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of September.
During the artillery combat on the 8th of September, Prince Imeretinski moved his corps from Tutchenitza to the Lovtcha road and took position on both sides of the road. General Skobeleff commanded the advance guard — consist- ing of the regiments Kaluga, No. 5, and Estland, No. 8, 2 rifle battalions, 8 sotnia,s of Cossacks, 4 batteries, and the 4 heavy guns. He occupied Brestovetz with the 3d Estland Battalion, placed 2 nine-pounder batteries and the 4 heavy guns in action on the height in rear of the town, and opened fire on the Krishin redoubt.
After the artillery fire had been continued until 8 p. m., the Kaluga Regiment was ordered to take the so-called "sec- ond laioll" of the ''Green Hills." The regiment advanced to
ArtiUery Attack on Plevna. 99
the attack with 2 battalions in first line, the 3d Battalion following as reserve with a distance of 500 yards; 9 com- panies of the Estland Regiment were told off as the general reserve of this attack, and 6 companies occupied Brestovetz. The Kaluga Regiment captured the "second knoll" ; carried on by its ardor, it continued the attack, took the ''third knoll," and penetrated to the rifle-trenches between that knoll and the Krishin redoubt; here the regiment was as- sailed by Turkish reserves and driven back to the "second knoll,'' where it was supported by the previously mentioned 9 Estland companies. The pursuing enemy was then him- self driven back. The 3 sotnias attached to the advanced guard had taken an active and skillful part in the infantry action, and proved very useful in seeking out and removing the wounded.
The Russian losses in the action amounted to 900 men, 700 of which fell on the Kaluga Regiment.
For the present the "second knoll" was held by the Russians; but when informed during the night that the gen- eral assault which he expected for the following day would not take place until some later day, General Skobeleff consid- ered hisadvanced position astoo risky and withdrew his right from the captured "second knoll" to the "first knoll," which was streng-thened feyadouble lineof rifle-trenches. Anattack on the "first knoll," attempted by several Turkish battalions at 5 a, m., was repulsed chiefly by the fire of the artillery. At 8 a. m, the attack was renewed with increased numbers; this time the Turks penetrated to within 60 paces of the rifle- trenches, but were again repulsed.
lUO Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
Anticipating a renewal of the attack, — which, however, did not talve place, — Skobeleff remained in his position with the Estland and Libau Regiments (the latter from the re- serve having relieved the Kaluga Regiment) and ?> rifle bat- talions. His right was on the "first knoll," his center was formed by the village of Brestovetz and the height in rear with 28 guns, his left by a series of rifle-trenches to the w^est of the village of Brestovetz. In rear of the position stood Prince Imeretinski with the Kaluga and Reval Regiments, a rifle battalion, and 3 four-pounder and 1 nine-pounder bat- teries as general reserve.
In the course of the night of the 9th-10th, Prince Imere- tinski received orders from General Zotofl:", chief of statf of the West Army, to gain possession of the ''third knoll" of the "Green Hills" next morning. He was reinforced for that purpose by the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division (of the IV. Corps), which crossed the Tutchenitza ravine at daybreak and took post on the right of the corps.
Prince Imeretinski entrusted General SkobelefE with the direction of the attack and placed at his disposal the 2d Bri- gade of the 2d Division, the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions, and 4 nine-pounder batteries. As additional support the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division was placed in readiness; the remaining troops of the coi'ps — 1st Brigade of the 2d Di- vision, 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, 3 four-pounder bat- teries— were posted in rear of Brestovetz as general reserve under General Dobrovolski. At daybreak (September 10th) the Estland Regiment captured the ''second knoll" almost
ArtiUcrt/ Attack on Flevna. 1«>1
without resistance, and Sl^obeleff had it fortified at once; in the construction of the rifle-trenches the lack of entrench- ing tools was sensibly felt and part of the men used the lids of their cooking-pots and their bare hands. To ensure the best possible field of fire to the front, the vines in the vine- yards were pulled up.
Skobeleff had the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division brought up at once, and took post with the troops under his command on the "second knoll" between the road and the Tutchenitza. ravine; 16 nine-pounders were placed in battery in the center ; the Susdal Regiment was posted in rear on the "first knoll" as reserve.
Not deeming it advisable to attempt the capture of the "third knoll," Skobeleff postponed it till the general attack ordered for the morrow.
To support the contemplated attack 2 companies of the Susdal Regiment escorted 12 nine-pounders and the 4 siege guns to the east side of the Tutchenitza ravine, where they were so posted as to sweep the slopes of the "third knoll" as well as the "third knoll" itself with their fire.
Comments.
1. The fact that the carriages of all the Russian guns were damaged by the fire of several days" duraticm was also met with in the siege of Kars. There it was attributed to the excessive elevation given to the guns on account of the great range.
2. The number of technical troops employed before
102 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
Plevna was altogether insufficient; there was but 1 sapper battalion with 5 infantry divisions, not counting the Rou- manians. But 35 sappers were at the disposal of Prince Imeretinski's corps, consisting of 2 infantry divisions; more- over, no entrenching tools were issued to that corps, while the lY. and IX. Corps, as well as the Roumanians, received at least a few hundred tools each from the field engineer park.
The Assault on Fkniu. 103
PART IX.
THE ASSAULT ON PLEVXA ON THE IITH AND 12TH OF SEPTEMBER.
1. Dispositions for the Assault.
The hour for the assault was selected at 3 p. m. of Sep- tember 11th, instead of at daybreak, for two reasons: first, to spare the troops a half-day of battle; second, to allow the artillery to use the forenoon in i)reparino; the assault by its fire. In order to keep the Turks as much as possible in the dark as to the time of the assault, to exhaust their attention, and to keep up their suspense, it was ordered that the artil- lery should open the heaviest possible fire at daybreak, pause all along the line at 9 a. m., to resume its fire at 11, and again suspend suddenly and simultaneously at 1 o'clock. The fire was to be resumed at 2:30 p. m. and continued until further orders; those batteries alone whose fire should be masked by Russian troops, suspending their fire for the time.
The attack was to be directed on three points: the Grivitza works, the Radischevo works, and against the Kris- hin works.
The Grivitza redoubt was to be attacked from the north- east by the Roumanians, and on the s<uith by the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division with 2 four-pounder batteries.
Against the Central redoubt tlie 1st Brigade of the
104 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
30th Division and the 2d Brigade of the lOtli Division were tola off.
The Krishin redoubt was to be attacked by the 1st Bri- gade of the IGtli Division, the 3d Rifle Brigade, the entire 2d Division, and 9 batteries.
The 1st Brigade of the 31st Division was charged with the protection of the entire line of the artillery from Grivitza to Radischevo; the 2d Brigade of the same division and 2 batteries formed the special reserve for the 1st Brigade, and was posted on the right edge of the Radischevo ravine.
The main reserve was posted in rear of the center, and consisted of the 2d Brigade of the 30th Division and 1 regi- ment of the 2d Brigade of the 5th Division, 3 batteries, and the 4th Hussars with a horse battery.
The 1st Brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division, with the 2 Cossack brigades and 2 horse batteries, all under com- mand of General Leontieff, had orders to cross the Vid if possible and gain the Sophia road, as well as to establish communication with Loshkareff's cavalry.
The 9th Hussars were posted on tlie Bulgareni road be- tween the IX. Corps and the Roumanians.
A brigade of Roumanian cavalry covered the right of the Roumanians as far as the Vid.
General Loshkarefif, who already had 4 Russian and 4 Roumanian cavalry regiments on the left bank of the Vid in the vicinity of Lower Dubnik, sought to establish com- munication with Leontieff's cavalry.
The rain, which began to fall on the evening of the 10th, continued without interruption until Sei^tember 12th.
The Assault on Plciiia. 105
On the early moruiDg of tlie 11th of September a dense fog covered the entire field; the ground was thoroughly soaked, and everywhere men and horses moved with diflS- cult}'. Still any further postponement of the assault was not advisable,
2, Attack of the R'ujht ^Vin(| on the Grivitza Works.
The double attack on the Grivitza redoubt — from the north by the Roumanians, from the south by the Russians — was carried out without any tactical combination what- ever; the final meeting of the Russians and Roumanians in the captured redoubt appears in the descriptions of both parties more like an accidental meeting than the result of a bloody struggle carried out according to a common plan.
According to Roumanian accounts, parts of the 3d and 4th Divisions advanced to the attack from the north at 3 p. m. as ordered, and were three times repulsed. At 0 p. m. there was a lull in the fight, and at 7:30 p. m. the 2d Rifle Battalion and the 16th Dorobanzes (militia) Regiment re- newed the attack and captured the redoubt, assisted by the Russian Archangel Regiment. The losses of the Rouma- nians— 56 officers and 2,.500 men dead and wounded — give clear proof of the bravery and contempt of death with which that young army had here undergone its baptism of fire; the tactical decision of the attack, ho\v«ner, was probably brought about by the advance of the Russian brigade from the south.
1 OG Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
The 1st Brigade of the 5tli Division under Major-Gen- eral Kodionof, the Archangel Regiment, the Wologda Regi- ment, and 2 batteries crossed the Grivitza brook, passed through the village, and formed for attack to the west of the latter. Both batteries were in the center, on the right the Archangel Regiment, on the left the ^Yologda Regiment. Each regiment deployed a rifle company as skirmishers in front and formed the three battalions in rear in three lines, the first two in company columns, the rear one in battalion column.
Immediately upon crossing the brook the brigade re- ceived severe artillery fire from the w^orks on the left bank of the Grivitza brook, slightly to the left of the direction of attack; a caisson of the 6th Battery was blown up.
The brigade now advanced to the attack: the Archangel Regiment straight on the redoubt; the Wologda Regiment, advancing slightly its left shoulder, past the redoubt and against an entrenched camp 500 yards farther in rear and connected with the redoubt by trenches.
Twice during the advance General Rodionof halted the troops in sheltered depressions to restore order in the bat- talions. On approaching the redoubt the interval between the regiments, through which the two batteries had kept firing, was closed. The Archangel Regiment threw itself on the redoubt from the front, passed the deep, steep ditch, and climbed the breastwork, which was 10 feet high and slippery from the rain. At the same time a portion of the Wologda Regiment, which had overlapped the redoubt on the
The Assault on Plevna. 107
left, entered the work from the gorge; the rest of the regi- ment advanced past the redoubt against the camp, engaged the troops posted there, and prevented them from coming to the support of the garrison of tlie redoubt, which was cut down after a furious resistance. From the north, Roumanian troops — particularly the 2d Rifle Battalion — also penetrated into the redoubt. Five guns were captured. The Colonel of the Archangel Regiment and the commander of the Rou*- manian brigade were killed near the works.
At 7:30 the Russian brigade was assembled at the re- doubt. Colonel Rykatschef relinquished his attack on the west camp, assumed command in place of General Rodionof, who had been wounded, re-formed the disordered battalions, and posted them partly in the redoubt, partly in the adjoin- ing trenches. During the night the Turks make three at- tacks to recover the redoubt, but were repulsed by fire and bayonet.
The loss of the brigade was 22 officers and 1,300 men killed and wounded.
A sapper company, an improvised sapper company formed of men of both regiments, and on the extreme right, as outer flank guard, the Gth Sotnia of the 34th Don Cossacks had a part in the action.
3. The Attack of the Center on the Radischevo Works.
The troops in the center, between the Bulgareni and Lovtcha roads, may be divided into four groups according to their tasks:
108 Tactical l^iiidics on the Battles Around Plevna.
((/) To attack the Kadischevo works: the regiments Uglitz, No. 63, Kazan, No, 64, Jaroslaf, No. 117, Shuja, No. 118, all under the command of Major-General Schnitnikolt', commander of the 30tli Division;
(&) To protect the batteries : the regiments Penza, No. 121, and Tamboflf, No. 122;
(c) Special reserve of the center: the regiments Kos- loff. No. 12.3, and Woronesh, No. 124;
(d) Main reserve: the regiments Galitz, No. 20, Koloma, No. 119, Serpuchoff, No. 120. An unfortunate accident dis- arranged the combination from the beginning. The dense fog, brisk infantry fire on the extreme left (Skobeleff), and an insignificant movement in the Turkish trenches caused one battalion of the Uglitz Kegiment to attack prematurely at 11 a. m., drawing after it the rest of the regiment and also the Jaroslaf Regiment. After a severe action, the two regi- ments captured the rifie-trenches of the enemy in front of the redoubt, but were compelled to retire on the arrival of Turk- ish reinforcements, after losing half of their men and nearly all their officers.
Though deprived by this accident of half of his troops, General Schnitnikoff deemed it advisable to adhere to the original disposition and advanced at the appointed time with the Kazan and Shuja Regiments. On the march he met the retreating Uglitz and Jaroslaf Battalions, which carried disorder into his ranks. It was in vain that the Kos- loff and Woronesh Regiments and the Galitz Regiment of the main reserve were brought forward in support of the attack.
The Assault on Pleimi. 109
The attack was finally repulsed with enormous loss: the 7 regiments engaged lost altogether 110 officers and 5,200 men killed and wounded; the greater part of the losses fall- ing- on the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments.
Jj. Attack hi/ the Left Winf/ on the Krisltin Tro/-A-.S',
The task set General Hkobeletf was to capture the so- called "third knoll" of the ''Green Hills" and the line of re- doubts in rear of Krishin, which formed the direct protec- tion of the camp of the Turkish reserves.
To enable him to accomplish his task, the following troops were placed at his disposal: the regiments Vladimir. Xo. 61, Susdal, No. 02, Reval, No. 7, the 3d Rifle Brigade, 3 nine-pounder batteries, 1 four-j)ounder battery, and 1 siege guns,
Skobeleff resolved on the immediate capture of the "third knoll" and to attack the redoubts in rear simultane- ously with the general attack at 3 p. m.
After the 10 guns, jjosted previously at the east of the Tutchenitza ravine, had taken the northern slopes of the "Green Hills" for some time under fire, Skobeleff. at 10 a. m., advanced and occupied the "third knoll" with the following troops: in the center 2 Vladimir battalions in two lines of company columns, on their right the 10th Rifle Battalion, on the left 3 Estland companies, in rear as special reserve the 3d Vladimir Battalion and 3 batteries. The "thiid knoll" svns deserted by the enemy, but he was annoyed by fiie from Turkish infantry in the trenches between this knoll and the redoubts.
110 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plerna.
The 3d Vladimir Battalion having been bi'()u«;ht to the front to reinforce the fighting line, its place as special reserve was taken by the Susdal Regiment, formed in battalion col- umns in rear of the fighting line under the best cover ob- tainable. About 2 p. m. strong lines of Turkish skirmishers advanced up the slopes of the "Green Hills" against the troops on the top; the fire of the Turkish infantry increased more and more in strength and inflicted sensible losses not only on the troops in the firing line, but also on the first echelon of the reserves posted 1,000 yards in rear.
In view of these circumstances and of the fact that the general attack was soon to begin. General Skobelefl: ordered the Susdal Regiment to drive back the Turkish skirmish lines. This was done; the Turks did not withstand the attack and fell back on their redoubts; from there and from the adjoining rifle-trenches they maintained a brisk and galling fire against the Russian troops.
About 2:30 p. m. Skobelefl"s troops had approximately the following position: on the "third knoll" in the firing line next the enemy the Vladimir and Susdal Regiments and the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions; in the depression between the "third" and "second knoll" the Reval Regiment; in the entrenched position on the "second knoll" 2 Kaluga and 2 Estland battalions with 3 batteries; in the depression be- tween the "first" and "second knoll" the Libau Regiment and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions; 1 Kaluga battalion held the village of Brestovetz.
The Assault on PJeviia. ill
At 2:30 p. m. the batteries on the "second kuoll" upened over the heads of the troops on the "third knoll."
At 3 p. m, Skobeleff gave the order to attack: the troops in first line descended from the "third knoll." crossed the deep depression between the knoll and the height beyond, and began to ascend the steep height on whose crest lay the three strong redoubts, the western one of which was known as the '^redoubt of Krishin." The redoubts were connected by trenches and on the slopes in front were a series of rifle- trenches.
The attack, which was directed at first against the east- ern and middle redoubt, was received by a murderous mus- ketry fire from the rifle-trenches and redoubts, and also In- artillery fire from the redoubts. The attack of the IV. Corps on the entrenchments north of Kadischevo having mean- while failed, the artillery of the western portion of these fortifications then directed its tire across The Tutchenitza ravine against ihe troops of C>kobelefl', which wore attacking the Turkish right
The efficacy of this severe fire and the ensuing losses brought the attack to a stop; part of the attacking troops halted in the depression, and those which had begun to ascend the further slope tried to find cover, and ojiened a ratlier in- effective fire against the we-ll -covered adversary.
Skobeleff now ordered the Reval Regiment 1 > advance to the support of the troops engaged, and the Libau Regi- ment and 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions, posted as reserves between the ''first" and ''second knoll," to take the place of
1 1 2 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
the Reval Regiment in the depression between the "second" and "third knoll."
The Reval Regiment advanced with firm order, crossed the brook, ascended the bare slope beyond, and carried for- w^ard with it parts of the troops engaged there, but the at- tack of this regiment was also stopped half way up, and the remnants of the Madimir and Susdal Regiments and 9th and 10th Ritle Battalions began to fall back — singly at first, then in crowds.
Skobeleff now had to decide whether to throw in his last reserves for a decisive attack, or, in view of the failure of the attack of the IV. Corps, to order the retreat of the troops engaged, under cover of part of his reserves.
He decided for the former: the Libau Regiment (leaving 3 companies in rear) and the 11th and 12th Rifle Battalions were ordered forward, and were joined by those remnants of the Vladimir, vSusdal, and Reval Regiments and the 9th and 10th Rifle Battalions which were still in the firing line; the whole line advanced with a cheer in the direction of the middle redoubt and captured the rifle-trenches in front, the Turks withdrawing within the line of redoubts.
Encouraged by their first success, the Russian battalions continued the attack with great determination, though in disordered crowds; the nearer they approached the enemy's position, the less effective became the enemy's fire; the Turk- ish line wavered and the foremost Russian detachments penetrated into the trenches between the eastern and middle redoubts. At 4 :25 p. m. the middle redoubt was in the hands
The Assault on Flerna. 113
of the assailants, who seized almost the entire line of tiench up to the eastern redoubt. One gun was abandoned in the redoubt.
Several thousand men of various organizations soonfilied the interior of the captured redoubt and trenches; those ar- riving later found no shelter from the fire from the other positions of the Turks; the captured middle redoubt was, moreover, open to the rear and its interior exposed to the fire from the western (Krishin) redoubt, which was making great havoc among the Russians crowded together in the interior. At the same time strong Turkish reserves ad- vanced to the counter-attack from the entrenched camp in rear of the line of redoubts, partly against the left, partly against the front of the Russians.
Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff gathered some 300 men from those inside the redoubt, and, moving 1*00 paces to the left, led them against the enemy; this nucleus was joined by other crowds of assailants arriving at tliis time, and about 5:15 p. m. the counter-attack against the Russian left was repulsed, though not without great loss.
At 5:o0 p. m., when the Turkish fire slackened somewhat, the Russians began to entrench the captured position on the side toward the enemy; the almost total absence of entrench- ing tools was painfull}^ felt.
The rapid retreat of the Turks who had advanced from the Krishin redoubt against the Russian left had been influ- enced to a certain extent by the appearance of General Leontieff's cavalry in the vicinity; a horse battery opened
1 ] 4 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
fire on the redoubt and a detachment of dismounted Cossacks occupied the village of Krishin, thereby making the Turks uneasy for their own right flank and preventing an energetic execution of the counter-attack against the Russian left.
Meanwhile a brisk fire was maintained from the east- ern against the captured middle redoubt, and part of the connecting trench was still in the hands of the Turks. An officer collected a detachment of about 100 volunteersto drive them out, seized the trench, and, carried away by success, advanced against the east redoubt, where most of the men fell under the murderous fire of the Turks,
Meanwhile Colonel Shestakoff of the general stafl", act- ing under orders from Prince Imeretinski, was busy in rear of the front collecting the scattered men and forming them into detachments. Thanks to his efforts, the following de- tachments formed of scattered men arrived in line of battle at 5 p. m., in addition of the 3 Libau companies which had been held back at first: 2 Susdal companies, ^ Eeval com- pany, 2^ Vladimir companies, and 1 company of the 12th Rifle Battalion. The detachments belonging to the Vladi- mir and Reval Regiments and 12th Rifle Battalion rein- forced the defenders of the middle redoubt, over which Major-General Dobrovolski, co^imander of the rifle brigade, and, after he was mortally wounded, Major-General Teb- jauik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division, assumed command.
The 5 liibau and Susdal companies were led forward against the east redoubt, supported by mixed detachments
The Assault on Plevna. 115
from the middle redoubt; at 5:30 p. m. tke east redoubt fell into the hands of the Russians; Lieutenant-Colonel Mosze- woi, of the Susdal Regiment, assumed command there.
With the approach of darkness the Turkish fire slack- ened somewhat, but never died out completely throughout the night.
5. The Night of Septemher llth-12th.
As darkness settled down, the troops of the Russian left wing occupied about the following positions:
Fractions of the Vladimir, Susdal, Reval, and Libau Regiments and of the 4 rifle battalions held the two (^ap tured redoubts and the trenches between them; opposite their front was the entrenched camp of the Turks between the town and river; on their left the Krishin redoubt was still in the hands of the Turks; on their right, beyond the Tutchenitza ravine, were the western works of the Rad- ischevo entrenchments.
In the rear of the line of battle the ''third knoll" was not occupied; on the ''second knoll" 2 Estland battalions and 2 very weak Kaluga battalions covered the great artillery position of 24 guns; 1 Kaluga battalion held the village of Brestovetz.
To guard the intermediate space of almost 2,000 yards between the captured redoubts and the artillery position on the "second knoll," General Skobeleff personally took posi- tion at dark with 2 weak battalions in the middle of this space at the northern foot of the '"third knoll" and deployed
J 1 6 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
2 companies to cover his right and left, one fronting east, the other west; the remaining 3 companies halted with Skobeleff and faced north.
Scattered men, singly and in groups, moved about every- where— some of them returning from the redoubts, where they could no longer find cover, and some coming from the rear and endeavoring to find their organizations in the line of battle. Skobeleff had as many or them as possible col- lected by members of his staff and formed into a battalion, without regard to the organizations to which they belonged. After some hours, the battalion had reached a strength of more than 1,000 men, when a new subdivision was made, the men of the several regiments and of the rifle brigade being each formed into a separate company.
The 2 companies mentioned had hardly deployed on the flanks when Turkish detachments advanced on the left from the direction of Krishiu, but were repulsed by the company deployed on that flank.
Soon afterward volleys were fired against the Russian position from the right and the bullets fell near the reserves. The darkness prevented the firing troops from being recog- nized, but patrols reported them to be Russians. Deeming it possible that detachments of the IV. Corps may have crossed the Tutchenitza ravine to make a night attack, Sko- beleff forbade his men to fire. Patrols were again sent out and made a positive report that the firing troops were Turks some hundred paces in front of the Russian skirmish line.
Tlie Assault on Flcuna. 1 1 7
Fire was opened on both sides, but, on account of the darli- ness, nothing but the Hash of the guns could be seen.
To get his main body out of the line of the Turkish flank- ing fire, Skobeleff led it about 1,000 paces to the rear in the utmost silence, and prolonged his skirmish lines, which had remained in jjlace, by adding a deployed company to each. The fatigue of his men had become such that they would fall asleep as soon as halted; to be prepared for an emer- gency, Skobelelf had them waked up from time to time and formed.
By accident a sotnia of Caucasian and half a sotuia of Don Cossacks arrived at t^kobeleff's position at midnight, whereupon he immediately sent patrols to the right and left beyond the skirmish lines; 60 of the Cossacks he re tained, resolved to oppose them to any sudden attack by the enemy.
Upon report that the firing line was getting short of ammunition, Skobeleff had ordered up ammunition-carts; two of them reached his position and he sent the ammuni- tion to the firing line by special detachments. The differ- ence in the armament caused some difficulty: the infantry was armed with the Krenka, the Rifles with the Berdan rifle, and the latter were therefore unable to use the infantry ammunition, which alone was contained in the two carts. A Cossack non-commisioned officer, who with 20 Cossacks was sent after Berdan cartridges, finally brought a small supply in the nosebags of his detachment ; thus relieving the want to some extent.
118 Tactical ^Studies on the Battles Around Plcrna.
While the events just described were taking place in rear of the line of battle proper, the utmost activity was maintained in the latter throughout the night.
The open gorges of the two captured redoubts had to be closed, the enemy's rifle-trenches had to be arranged for cover from the opposite side, and some new trenches had to be made to cover the left against the Krishin redoubt, the lines having been marked out during daylight by Captain Kuropatkin of the general staff. The execution of the work was extremely difficult, owing to the almost total absence of entrenching tools; the Russian soldiers well understood the importance of the task in view of the murderous charac- ter of the enemy's fire, and worked for dear life with bayo- nets, side arms, camp-kettle lids, and bare hands.
With the beginning of darkness the Turkish fire had considerably slackened; but toward 10 p. m. strong Turkish bodies rushed on the Russian position with much yelling and a severe fire, but in this, as well as in several subsequent attempts, they were repulsed by the fire of the Russians. In one of these attempts the retreating assailants were mis- taken for Russians by fresh Turkish reserves which were coming up, and subjected to a severe musketry fire.
6. TJie 12th of Septemher.
Toward 6 a. m. the Turks opened a severe artillery fire
from the Krishin redoubt, the entrenched camp, and the
works beyond the Tutchenitza ravine, and caused at once
considerable losses to the Russians. To engage the Krishin
The Assault on Plevna. 119
redoubt Skobeleff ordered 4 nine-poimders to be brought inside the middle redoubt and to open fire, which served to ^encourage the troops in the redoubt.
Soon afterward large bodies of Turks, preceded by dense swarms of skirmishers, advanced against the Russian left and penetrated to within 300 yards of the Russian position despite the severe fire with which they were greeted. There the attack was checked and soon converted into a retreat; at 900 yards from the Russian position the Turks halted and opened a severe fire.
At 8 a. m. a second Turkish attack began, which was chiefly directed against the left flank of the Russian first line; Skobeleff, who was on the ''third knoll," dispatched from there a skirmish line, which opened fire at 900 yards against the^ right flank of the attacking Turks; a battery was brought up to the "third knoll" to fire also against their right. Notwithstanding the effective cross-fire of the 12 guns (8 on the "third knoll" and 4 in the middle redoubt), the Turks approached the Russian rifle-trenches to within 500 yards, came to a halt, maintained a brisk fire for some time, and then fell back with great loss.
Meanwhile the defenders of the east redoubt had been engaged since early morning with the enemy's detachments posted on the outskirts of Plevna and attempting to turn the Russian right.
Convinced of the importance of the advantages gained by General Skobelefl", Osman Pasha utilized the inactivity of the Russians opposite his loft and center to send all troops
1 20 Tactical /Studies on the Battles Around Plana.
that could possibly be spared to reinforce his threatened right.
Leaving a thiclc skirmish line, which maintained a severe tire, in a well-covered position opposite the two redoubts in the hands of the Russians, the Turks assembled their main force near the Krishin redoubt, to advance from there against the Russian left. The reinforcements, withdrawn from the east, moved partly through Plevna against the right of the line of captured redoubts, partly in the Tutch- enitza ravine against the position of the Russians on the "third knoll."
At 10:30 a. m. the third attack began, at first from front and left against the middle redoubt. After two Turkish batteries had caused great havoc among the defenders crowded together inside, these men, after an uninterrupted exposure to"severe fire for thirty hours, began to waver and to leave the redoubt — singly at first, afterward In crowds. The defenders of the east redoubt followed the infectious example, but when Skobeleff came galloping up from the ''third knoll" and spoke words of admonition and cheer, all turned about and reoccupied the redoubts before the Turks were able to take possession of them. Isolated Turkish de- tachments which succeeded in penetrating into the redoubts were cut down.
On returning to his position on the "third knoll" Sko- belefif sent forward some companies, formed of dispersed men, to support the troops engaged at the redoubts.
Meanwhile Turkish troops were forming partly in the
The Assault oit FIcciki. 121
Tutchenitza ravine itself, partly on its eastern edge (north of the Radischevo ravine), for the purpose of attacking the "third knoll," A company formed of dispersed riflemen was deploj'ed for the defense of the western edge, while two guns attempted to enfilade the ravine; the Turks nevertheless su(.'ceeded in ascending the w'estern edge of the ravine and driving back the Russian riflemen, and it was only when assisted by two Libau companies (which had been detached yesterday and had very insignificant losses) and a Caucasian Cossack sotnia that the Turks were driven back into the ravine. The Turkish reserves in the ravine at the southern exit of Plevna fell back into the town.
Skobeleff had become convinced on the 11th Tliat tlie capture of the entrenched height between town and river would decide the victory, and, on the other hand, that he was too weak to gain that result. Having asked for reinforce- ments on the 11th, General Skobeleff expressed to Colonel Orloff, who arrived from Grand Headquarters to inform him- self of the state of affairs, his opinion that without reinforce- ments he would be unable to maintain his position..
Early on the morning of the 12th Skobeleff received a copy of the following order addressed to General Prince Imeretinski :
"By direction of the Connnander-iu-Chief, I order you and General Skobelett' to entren(.-h and maintain yourselves In the positions captured to-day. We cannot send rein- forcements, because we have none.
(Signed) "Zo/o/f, LinifciKnif-GcncrdJ."
122 Tactical aS7//<//V.s- oh the Battles Around Plevna.
jS'otwitlistajiding this discouraging order, SkobelefE hoped for a favorable turn, since the entire IV, Corps stood east of the Tutchenitza ravine, apparently in readiness for battle, but inactive.
At 10:30 a. m., as the third Turkish attack began. Colo- nel OrlofE delivered to General Skobeleff the following order :
"By order of the Commander-in-Chief, if you cannot hold the captured positions, you are to fall back — if possible, not before evening — in the direction of Tutchenitza, covered by the cavalry of General Leontieff. Communicate this or- der, which is to be kept secret otherwise, to General Prince Imeretihski. The Grivitza redoubt is in our hands, but the attack is not to be continued, and we are to fall back slowly.
8:30 a.m.
(Signed) '"Zotoff, Lkiitcnant-Gciivral."'
Even after the receipt of this order Skobeleff did not give up hope of a general turn for the better; he hoped at any moment to see the IV. Corps advance to the attack to the east of the Tutchenitza ravine.
The situation of the defenders in the redoubts was be- coming more and more critical, receiving fire not only from the Krishin redoubt in front, but from the Radischevo works in rear, ^ At 1 p, m, 2 of the 4 guns in the middle redoubt had become useless and the other 2 were almost without men and teams, Skobeleff ordered these guns to be relieved by 3 guns of the 5th battery of the 3d Brigade posted in rear of the ''third knoll." The movement having attracted the at- tention of the Turks, thev increased their fire, causing con-
The Assault on Pleimi. 123
siderable loss to the newly arrived guus iu the redoubt, bu1 the latter now opened on the Krishin redoubt; the one ammunition-wagon brought along was i^osted between the breastwork and traverse, the only comparatively safe place in the redoubt. It was nevertheless blown uj) by a hostile shell, killing and wounding many men in the narrow space of the redoubt; among the wounded was Major-General Tebjanik (who had assumed command in the redoubt after the wounding of General Dobrovolski) and Captain Kuro- patkin of the general staff.
At 2 p. m, the last available troops, sent by General Prince Imeretinski, arrived. Two exceedingly small Kaluga battalions (heretofore retained as protection for the artillery position) and a detachment made up of 200 dispersed rifle- men were disposed as follows: 4 Kaluga companies pro- ceeded to the redoubts, ?> companies covered the right on the ''third knoll" against the Tutehenitza ravine, ;5 companies took post in rear of the left. The combined rifle detachment was at first posted in rear of the "second knoll" as a last general reserve, but was soon ordered forward to the left, where Skobeleff also ordered 4 guns to proceed and to take up a covered position.
Soon afterward the fourth attack began from the Krishin redoubt. This time Skobeleff allowed the Turks to approach to within 500 j'ards and then greeted them with rapid musketry fire from his infantry, and canister from his 4 concealed guns. The Turks halted and replied to the fire, but their fresh rc'serves were not able to carry the attack
124 Tactical IStiidics on the Battles Around Plana.
forward; after three-quarters of an hour of very costly fire action, the Turks fell back.
At 2:30 p. m., when Skobeleff arrived at the redoubts to examine personally how matters stood in his hrst line, the fortifications presented a ghastly spectacle. The interior of both redoubts and the trench connecting them were filled with corpses; the gorge of the east redoubt, open toward Plevna, was closed by a breastwork made of corpses; the 3 guns of the 3d Brigade in the middle redoubt were dis- mounted, the cannoneers killed or wounded. The 2 dis- mounted guns of the 2d Brigade were removed, and the aban- doned Turkish gun was rendered unserviceable by the re- moval of the breech-block.
The movements of the Turkish troops were plainly vis- ible as they assembled from all directions at Plevna against Skobeletf's right. Those Turkish troops which had hereto- fore made several attacks from the Krishin redoubt against the Russian left departed for the same point.
Upon his return from the redoubts to the "Green Hills,'" Skobeleff was informed that the Shuja Regiment, numbering 1,300 men, had come from the center to support him. He retained the regiment in reserve and sent several hundred dispersed men to reinforce the defenders of the redoubts.
At 4:30 p. m. the Turks advanced in several lines to make the fifth attack simultaneously on both redoubts. The severe fire which greeted them did not check them; though the leading columns resolved themselves into disordeied swarms, &till they continued to advance with determination, and were followed in rear by fresh troops.
The Assault on Flecua. 125
Before this overwlielming attack the defenders of the middle redoubt began to give way and abandoned the re- doubt in swarms; the small body of brave men which faced the attack fell after a furious hand-to-hand struggle, among them Major Gortaloff, who had greatly distinguished him- self on this bloody day.
Despite the loss of the middle redoubt, Lieutenant-Colo- nel Moszewoi held out in the east redoubt against the attack which was now directed against him from the front and both flanks. To prevent the useless sacrifice of the brave garri- son of this redoubt, Skobelefl:" ordered Moszewoi to fall back, and in order to make the withdrawal possible he advanced in person with the Shuja Kegiment and a. battery, covering the retreat of all troops engaged in front. An attempt at pursuit on the part of the Turks was frustrated by a splendid charge of 2 sotnias of Cossacks.
A battery of 2-1 guns on the ''second knoll,'' guarded by some detachments formed of dispersed men of the Vladimir, Susdal, and Reval Regiments, covered the further retreat, the troops carrying their wounded along as best they could. On the 13th of September Skobeleft" remained almost the entire day on the "first knoll," ^ind at 7 p. ni. fell back by or- der to 15ogot.
7. Losses.
The total loss sustained h\ the Russians in the attacks on Plevna from the 7th to the 12th of September is stated in round numbers at 300 officers and 12.500 men. including 60 officers and 3,000 men killed.
126 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
According to the special lists of losses, the 2 regiments of the right wing which captured the Grivitza redoubt lost 22 officers and 1,305 men; the 7 regiments which vainly attacked the Radischevo works in the center lost 110 officers and 5,249 men. • Adding about 300 for losses sustained dur- ingthe artillery attack on the first days of the attack, wehave for the troops of the left wing under Skobeleff — 6 regiments and 4 rifle battalions — a loss of 160 officers and 5,600 men.
Individual losses cannot be accurately ascertained from the available data; still some figures may be given as accurate.
The Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments, which attacked pre- maturely in the center, lost respectively 370 and 300 killed. Of Skobeleff's troops, the Vladimir Regiment lost 200, the Susdal Regiment 150 killed; the former regiment lost 36 offi- cers killed and wounded, the latter 15 officers.
The 3d Rifle Brigade, consisting of 4 battalions, which had entered upon the theater of war barely 3,000 strong and had lost at Lovtcha 1 officer and 132 men killed and 17 offi- cers and 400 men wounded, lost here its commander, Major- General Dobrovolski, 3 officers and 177 men killed, and 20 officers and 666 men wounded.
Of the superior leaders, Major-General Dobrovolski, of the rifle brigade, was among the killed, as already stated: Major-General Rodionof, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 5th Division, and Major-General Tebjauik, commander of the 1st Brigade of the 16th Division, were wounded. The loss
The As.suKJt on Plevna. 127
of the Roumaniaus — 50 officers and 2,500 men — has been previously stated.
The losses of the Turks are not accurately known; op- posite General Skobeleff they must have been very heavy.
Comments. 1. The above description of the attack on the (irivitza redoubt is based on the official Russian report; other ac- counts state that two attacks were repulsed and that the third succeeded. The difference may be explained by the two halts made by the assailing troops, which practically did interrupt the advance, though it does not imply that the attack was repulsed.
There was no preparation by infantry fire; the tactical form of the attack was about the same as that of the uu- successful assault on the same works on July 30th. but in this instance the real result was gained by the advance of portions of the Wologda Regiment past the flank of the re- doubt, for it seems that the entrance of portions of the regi- ment through the gorge of the redoubt, and the engagement of the Turkish reserves in rear by other detachments, brought the attack to a successful issue.
It is not quite clear whether in forming for the attack the first and second line of each regiment consisted of one battalion each, or whether two battalions were formed abreast, each in two lines of company columns; in view of the formation used on other occasions where they are clearly described, the latter seems more probable.
128 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
Since the two tii'st lines are expressly stated to have been formed in company columns, it may be assumed that in the third line the battalions were formed in mass. It would seem, however, that all three lines started at the same time with comparatively short distances; the two halts seem to have diminished the distances between the lines, the whole in the further course of the attack formed a single mass of unequal depth; special tactical employment of the lines and reserve was out of the question. All reached the enemy about the same time.
Although the faulty cooperation of the two columns who were attacking the same work may be attributed to several causes, it nevertheless remains reprehensible from the pro- fessional point of view; proper combination and coopera- tion of the double attack would no doubt have accomplished its object more quickly and with less loss,
2, The details of the failure of the attack of the center are still enshrouded in obscurity; no tactical details are known and the whole thing seems to have been a wild chaos from the beginning.
The fact that an unfortunate accident caused the prema- ture advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments does not provoke criticism; but it may well be asked whether the procedure after that event might not have been better con- trived. Obeying the letter of his orders, General Schnit- nikof held back the two regiments still in hand until 3 p, m,; for three hours he allowed the regiments v.ho had advanced prematurely to fight single hauded. It might have been
The Assault on Plevna. 129
assumed as certain that these two regiments alone would not be able to take the enemy's works; on the other hand, it could not be presumed that these; regiments would be really eifect- ive after lighting single-handed for three hours against great odds. Hence, after the advance of the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments, General Schuitnikof sliould either have pushed the Kazan and Shuja Regiments also forward at once, or the Koslof and Woronesh Regiments should have been brought up in order to undertake the attack with sufficient strength from the very beginning; for, as above stated, the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments could, under the circumstances, not be counted upon at 3 o'clock.
Under the circumstances, there was no good reason for postponing the attack until 3 o'clock pursuant to the disposi- tion, for not only had the advance of those two regiments compelled a large part of the Russian artillery to cease fir- ing, but the Turks had long been alarmed and prepared for the assault; hence the contemplated surprise could under no circumstances be realized.
Did the commander-in-chief, posted in rear of the cen- ter, receive any information whatever of the premature at- tack? If yes, when? Did he express no opinion whatever to General Schnitnikof as to what he should do? In what formation was the attack made? When and in what direc- tion did the regiments from the reserve advance? These are questions which can not as yet be answered, but which are indispensable for any real criticism of the bloody events in the center.
130 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
3. In turning now to the events on the Russian left, the peculiar mode of command obtaining here attracts our attention. Prince Imeretinski was the senior general, but he played an entirely subordinate role by the side of the younger Skobeleff, and was pushed altogether into the back- ground by the latter.
During the initiatory actions on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of September Imeretinski officially had the command of all troops of the left wing. Skobeleff was subordinated to him, but acted independently as commander of an advance guard, which was increased to a strength equal to two-thirds of the whole corps. Since a very small part of the troops under Imeretinski's command was not engaged on the 10th, his to- tal subsidence is less striking. But on the 11th of Septem- ber matters were different: on this day Skobeleff was charged direct from the headquarters of the West Army witli the conduct of the attack on the south front of the enemy's position, and was reinforced by part of Imeretinski's troops; the latter was left in command of the remaining troops, and ordered to support Skobeleff' if necessary. In the course of the action Prince Imeretinski gradually sent all his troops to General Skobeleff's assistance, so that in the end he had not a company under his command and was a mere spectator on the battle-field, and was even favorably mentioned in the junior's direct report to the commander-in-chief for making himself useful in collecting the dispersed men and looking after the sanitary service. These are conditions for which our conception lacks understanding and expression!
The Assault on Plevna. 131
i. Skobelefif's method of couclucting the action exhib- its the traits discussed in connection with the events of July 30th, on a larger scale; careful reconnaissance of the enemy's position; general prepai-ation of the attack by concentrated artillery fire, careful formation of the infantry in the fighting line, special reserves in rear of the flanks, and a general re- serve in two lines ; special preparation of the attack by brisk fire of strong, well-covered skirmish lines, increased where- ever possible by that of some batteries or at least some guns brought into the front line; advance of the infantry by stages, occupation of the new line reached, and renewed prep- aration by infantry and artillery fire from that point; great care for the safety of the flanks ; wise husbanding of the re- serves; wherever practicable, new reserves were foiuied from troops heretofore engaged; notwithstanding the un- favorable condition of the ground for cavalry, the latter was at the right place at the decisive moment, was properly em- pJoyed, and took a decisive part in the action; lastly, the in- defatigable efforts in collecting scattered men, which alone made it possible again and again to lead formed and half- fresh detachments into the action. To be sure, mistakes may have been made in the details of tactical employment of the individual bodies of troops, but the conduct of the battle as a whole presents a brilliant picture, interesting and fas- cinating in its smallest details.
5. It was only by their utmost efforts that the Turks succeeded on the 12th of September in recapturing the re- doubts lost on tlie preceding day, when the complete inac-
132 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
tivity of the Russians opposite the Turldsh left and center left the latter free to use most of their available troops for support of their right. Had the Turks failed to drive Skobe- lefif from the position he had captured — and there can be lit- tle doubt that this would have been the case, had the Rus- sian right and center shown auv activity whatever — had the Russians permanently ensconced themselves on the heights south of Plevna and posted their numerous artillery there, the remaining portions of the Turkish position would, it is presumed, have become untenable.
That the supreme command failed to appreciate the im- portance of the advantages gained by Skobeleff, or to do anything for their completion, preservation or retention, is probably due to the fact that the supreme command, posted in rear of the center near Radischevo, was so struck and in- fluenced by the defeat inflicted under its own eyes as to be unable to divert its mind to any other thought.
The complete inaction of the Russian center on the 12th at a time when but a short distance away the furious action on the "Green Hills" w^as fought out, does not admit of ex- planation by the theory of exhaustion and losses on the pre- vious day; there can be no doubt that the defeat witnessed on the preceding day had deprived the supreme command of confidence in a happy result, and that the only thought was to find some honorable way out of the battle.
At the time when Skobeleff's request for reinforcements was denied, 4 entirely fresh regiments were available in the center, not to mention the Ingermanland Regiment (of the
The Assault on Flecna. 133
3d Division), which was not mentioned in the disposition and seems to have been the special escort of headquarters.
The Shuja Regiment, which came to Skobeleff's assist- ance at noon on the 12th and covered the retreat of the other troops by an offensive movement, was one of the 7 regiments which on the preceding day had suffered defeat in the center; it may therefore be presumed that the other regiments (ex- cepting perhaps the Uglitz and Jaroslaf Regiments) were again fit for action; at any rate, they would have been capa- ble to undertake the protection of the artillery positions, thus setting those 4 fresh regiments free.
It should be stated, however, that the Shnja Regiment was sent to Skobeleff's assistance not by the supreme com- mand, which was opposed to any continuation of the battle, but by the commander of the IV. Corps, from courtesy, as it were.
1 34 Tactical Siudies on the Battles Around Plerna.
PART X.
WORK OF THE CAVALRY ON THE LEFT BANK OF
THE VID.
1. General Loshkareff from the 1th to the 19th of Septemhcr.
On September 7th General Loshkarett", commander of the 9th Cavalry Division, was posted on the highroad east of Grivitza, between the IX. Corps and the Roumanians, with the Astrachan Dragoons. No. 8, Kazan Dragoons, No. 9, Bug Lancer Regiment, No. 9, Don Cossacks, No. 9. and the 16th Horse and 2d Don Cossack Battery. He was ordered to move to Riben, pass the night there, to draw to himself both regular Roumanian cavalry regiments, the 5th and 6th irreg- ular cavalry regiments, and 1 Roumanian horse battery, to cross the Vid on the next day with the united cavalry corps, to make an energetic advance toward Dubnik, and to threaten the communications of Osman Pasha's army by taking suit- able position on the left bank.
Pursuant to this order, the 8 regiments of cavalry and 3 batteries were assembled by 9 p. m., September 7th, at Riben, on the right bank of the brook which there emptied into the Vid.
At 6 a. m. September 8th the Vid was crossed, and at n :30 a. m. Smaret-Trestenik was reached, 8 miles west of
Work of the Cavalry. 135
Riben and about the same distance to the northwest of the bridge over the Vid at Plevna.
Wheeling to the left, the cavalry corps took front to- ward the southeast against Plevna. Thence the Roschiori (Regular) Brigade with the battery moved to Dolni (Lower) Netropolie with instructions to observe Plevna and the road leading thence to Rahova. The main body of the corps marched through Grorni (Upper) Netropolie to Dolni Dub- nik, where it went into bivouac at 1:45 p. m. On the march the Cossacks of the advance guard captured a small herd of cattle, whose armed escort fled to Plevna; nothing further was seen of the enemy.
The line of outposts of the Roumanians at Lower Netrop- olie extended from the Vid opposite Bivolar to the Sophia road, facing the west front of the Plevna position. At the Sophia road began the Russian outpost line, formed of 2 Lancer squadrons and a sotnia of Cossacks, which extended at first southward along the heights between the Vid and highroad, turned oft" to the west half way between Lower and Upper Dubnik, crossed the road, and fronted toward Upper Dubnik; the length of the entire line was about lo miles. A separate detachment was posted in rear of the whole position in observation of the road from Lower Dub- nik to Rahova. The distance between Lower Dubnik and Lower Xetropolie is about 6 miles; the former place is 4 miles from the bridge over the Vid at Plevna, the latter about 2i miles.
At 4 p. m. reports were received from the outposts that
136 Tactical ^^tudies on the Battles Around Plevna.
from 1,000 to 1,500 cavalry, followed by 3 battalions of in- fantry, were approaching Lower Dubnik from Plevna; at the same time the Eoumanians reported that about 4 bat- talions of infantry with some cavalry were approaching Lower Netropolie, and that the works of the west front of the Plevna position had opened an artillery fire.
The Roumanians were ordered to maintain themselves at Lower Xetropolie as best they could ; the balance of the 9th Lancers (1st and 2d squadrons), a sotnia of Cossacks, and 4 Cossack guns were dispatched to support the Russian out- posts; the main body was posted in readiness at Lower Dubnik.
The Turkish infantry halted within the range of protec- tion afforded by the works; the 1.000 to 1,500 cavalry ad- vanced against the Russian line of outposts, which fell slowly back on its supports. Of the latter, one-half of the 1st squad- ron, supported by the formed detachments of the outpost squadrons (3d and 4th), advanced against the Turks from the front; the other half X)f the 1st squadron took them on the left flank, a platoon of the 2d squadron on the right flank; after a brief hand-to-hand conflict, the Turks fell back on their infantry, and the pursuing Lancers were received with infantry fire and retired. The Turkish cavalry left 70 dead on the ground. The Turkish detachments, which had been advancing against the Roumanians, retired to the works after a brief artillery fire, without having made a real at- tack. After the outposts had taken their former positions and the 4 Cossack guns had been posted under cover to one side
IVor/i- of the Cavalry. 137
of the highroad, the Turks again advanced to the attack at 6 p. m. with infantiy. At 1,500 yards the Turks were greeted with shrapnel fire from the heretofore concealed guns, and retired at once.
The total Russian losses on this day were 3 men and 9 horses killed, 9 men and 22 horses wounded. The Rou- manians suffered no loss.
Early on the 9th of September patrols weie sent out westward toward the Isker, southeastward along the high- road, and southward up the Vid. TTpon report of the ajj- pearance of Tcherkesses west of Upper Dubnik, 2 sotnias of the 9th Cossacks were dispatched in that direction at 2 J), m.
At 3:30 p. m. the outposts reported the approach of strong hostile bodies against the position of the Roschiori at Lower Netropolie, and that bodies of hostile troops were assembling at the bridge over the Vid, opposite the Russian position. Upon receipt of this report the whole corps was placed in readiness.
At 4:30 p. m, bodies of hostile troops api)eared on the heights on tlie left bank of the Vid, and farther to the south dense skirmish lines, cavalry on the flanks, closed infantry and artillery in rear, amounting to about (> batlalions, 1 cavalry regiment, and 4 guns. The attack was supported by artillery fire from the works of Opanetz, and was made with great determination. The Regular Brigade retired from Lower Netropolie. With a view of utilizing the favor- able situation for a successful attack. General Loshkareff
1 3 8 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
ordered tbe Koumaniaus to fall back to the heights of Upper Netropolie, in order to entice the Turks as far as possible from their works; as soon as the main body took the enemy in flank, the Roumanians were to attack in front.
The 8th Dragoon Regiment, on outpost south of Lower Netropolie, was to push 2 dismounted squadrons under cover of the high corn and a depression of the ground against the left flank of the Turks advancing on the Roumanians; the attack was to be supported on the left by 2 mounted squad- rons of the 9th Dragoons with 2 guns of the 16th Horse Bat- tery; 2 Lancer squadrons and the remaining 4 guns of the horse battery were posted on the right as protection against any Turks who might advance from the bridge over the Vid, Two sotnias of Cossacks having been dispatched to Upper Dubnik, and 2 squadrons of the 8th Dragoons (and probably also a sotnia of Cossacks) having been deployed on the extensive outpost line, there remained in general re- serve 4 squadrons of Dragoons and Lancers, 3 sotnias of Cos- sacks, the Cossack battery, and probably the 2 Kalarashi (Irregular) Regiments, of whose special employment nothing is known. The attack directed simultaneously against their front and flank caused the Turks to fall back to their works about 6 p. m., whereupon the troops at the bridge also with- drew.
While this engagement was in progress, the detachment of Cossacks dispatched to Upper Dubnik reported that it had encountered Tcherkesses, and that an infantry camp of some 10,000 men had been observed in rear of the wood west of Upper Dubnik.
Work of thv Vara! 11/. 139
Loshkareff now ordered his outposts into their original positions and moved with his main body to Lower Netropolie; the 9th Cossacks remained at Lower Dubnik with instruc- tions to light a large number of camp-fires, with a view of deceiving the enemy at Upper Dubnik as to the strength of the troops at Lower Dubnik, and at the same time to lead the Turks in Plevna to believe that reinforcements from Riben had arrived at Lower Netropolie in the evening.
The aggregate loss of the Russians and Roumanians on the 9th of September was: 1 man and 11 horses killed, 1 man missing, and 25 men and 31 horses wounded.
Early on September 10th the corps took up the following position: the Regular Brigade between Upper and Lower Netropolie, facing Plevna; all 1 Russian regiments with both batteries and the 5th Militia Regiment at Lower Dub- nik, their right resting on the highroad, their front fac- ing the south, covered by the Dubnik brook, a branch of the Vid; the Gth Militia Regiment, south of Upper Netropolie, connecting the two bodies.
The Turks could be plainly observed increasing and strengthening the works of their west front; a number of guns were placed in battery. The Turks were evidently ex- pecting the beginning of a serious attack from this direction.
Besides several small patrols which reconnoitered the ground on both sides of the highroad between the Vid and Isker, as well as the ground beyond the Isker, two strong patrols were dispatched with instructions to seek communi- cation with the cavalry of the left wing of the West Army
140 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
and to cross to the right bank of the Vid above Plevna if necessary for the accomplishment of their object. The 4th squadron of the 9th Lancers crossed to the right bank of the Vid at Medivan (O miles above the bridge) and scouted in an easterly direction as far as Kebel (2 miles southeast of Medivan), without meeting either Turks or Eussians. A sotnia of Cossacks which attempted to cross at Dessewitza (3 miles above the bridge) found the village held by Turkish infantry and cavalry, and fell back. The reports of all the patrols agreed that small bodies of Tcherkesses were roam- ing between the Vid and Isker, and that beyond the Iskcr they were in orreater force.
On September 11th a squadron of regular Roumanian cavalry was ordered to cross the Isker at Magaleta (west of Lower Dubnik) and to send patrols as fai* as possible in the direction of Rahova — Widdin. For the purpose of establish- ing communication with the left flank of the West Army, a second squadron of the 9th Lancers was sent out with or- ders to find the Russian troops under all circumstances, and, if possible, to communicate directly with the commander- in-chief. The squadron accomplished its object and re- turned next day by the same route, capturing a Turkish officer on the road. Moreover, a squadron of the 4th Dra- goons dispatched by General Leontief, commanding the cav- alry of the left wing of the West Army, arrived during the day.
During the night of the llth-12th skirmishing took place along the entire line of outposts with small bodies of
Work of the Valid nj. Ul
Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks, who endeavored to steal througli to the west and south and lost some killed and pris- oners in the attempt. At the same time many Bulgarians with empty wagons were leaving Plevna.
On the 12th of t^eptember the Turks began llu* <t)nst ruc- tion of a new battery along the highroad to sweep the ap- proaches of the bridge ; at Opanetz also a 4-gun battery was built against the Roumanian battery at Lower Netropolie.
On September 13th the Roumanian squadron dis- patched to Magaleta reported that the patrols on the pre- vious day found the ntugliboring villages full of Tcher- kesses and Bashi-bozouks. The total loss of the Roumanians in this reconnaissance consisted of 1 man wounded.
A detachment of 2 squadrons of Lancers, which ad- vanced on the highroad toward Telis and dispatched small patrols to the right toward the Isker and on the left to Rakita and Radomirtza,. found in all the villages plundering Tcherkesses and Bashi-bozouks, who retired on the appear- ance of the Lancers.
Patrols sent ont on the 14th and 15th of September rendered similar reports. On the latter day 7 sotnias of the Don Cossack Brigade of (Jt^noral Shernosuboff, with the 15th Don Cossack Battery, arrived at Lower Dubnik, and brought an order for the 0th Cossacks to move to Bogot (south of Plevna on the road to Lovtcha).
The patrols sent out on the lOth everywhere had skir- mishes with Tcherkesses and armed inhabitants; the Rou- manians at Magaleta lost 1 man and 1 horse killed.
142 Tactical Studies on the Battles Around Plevna.
During the night an attaclc was made from Plevna against the 5th Irregular Regiment, which was on outpost along the Vid. The attack was repulsed without loss to the Roumanians.
The patrols sent out southward on the 17th and 18th of September no longer met with hostile detachments; in the evening an attack on the outposts north of the highroad was repulsed